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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

FRED A. ALVAREZ,

:

Case No.

910019

Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder in the
first degree, a capital offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202 (1990), and from the imposition of a sentencing
enhancement of twenty years, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992), in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard
H. Moffat, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Should this Court refuse to consider defendant's

claims that (1) death-qualification of the jury violates the Utah
Constitution, (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury
on the elements of aggravated murder and (3) Utah Code Ann.
S 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992), the "gang enhancement," violates due
process, is void for vagueness and creates a new offense, when he

either totally failed to preserve such claims or only nominally
alluded to them in the trial court?

A reviewing court will

decline to review claims which a defendant has failed to preserve
for review through a timely and specific objection in the trial
court.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1141 (Utah 1989)

(declining to review a general motion to dismiss an element of
the offense because the asserted grounds "were not specifically
or distinctly stated to the court below").
2.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's claim

that the prosecution discriminatorily used its peremptory
challenges against two Hispanic jurors?

A party attacking a

peremptory jury challenge on equal protection grounds must
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination; if a
prima facie case is established, the challenged party must then
provide a race-neutral explanation to rebut the prima facie case.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1721
(1986); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 338 (Utah 1991).
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings of whether
purposeful discrimination has occurred must be given deference
and will only be set aside if clearly erroneous.

State v. Cantu

1111/ 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d
769, 778 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

If

inadequate factual findings exist, the matter must be remanded to
the trial court for further determination.
100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725; State v. Cantu m ,
(Utah 1988).

Batson, 476 U.S. at
750 P.2d 591, 597

If purposeful discrimination in the use of the
2

state's peremptory challenges is ultimately found, reversal of
the defendant's conviction is mandated without regard to the
harmlessness of the constitutional error,
100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725.
m ,

Batson, 476 U.S. at

Contra Harrison, 805 P.2d at 780; Cantu

750 P.2d at 597 (both incorrectly holding that a "harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is applicable).
3.

Was there sufficient evidence that defendant

committed the murder of Don Newingham, a homicide incident to one
criminal episode in which Shayne Newingham was killed?

"In

considering [whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict, the appellate court] review[s] the evidence and
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury.

[The appellate court]

reverse[s] a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted."

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444

(Utah 1983) (citations omitted).

It is defendant's burden to

marshal evidence supporting the jury's verdict when challenging
sufficiency of evidence.

State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738-39

(Utah App. 1990) .
4.

Was the trial court's finding that defendant acted

in concert with two or more persons under Utah Code Ann.
S 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992) clearly erroneous?

When challenging a

trial court's factual findings, "the appellant must show that the
3

findings of fact were clearly erroneous" by marshaling "all of
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and
then demonstrat[ing] that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings against an attack."

State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,

475-76 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Addendum A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Fred A. Alvarez was charged by amended
information with two counts of murder in the first degree, a
capital offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990)
(amended 1991 J1, for intentionally or knowingly causing the
deaths of Don and Shayne Newingham (R. 29-31).

Following a jury

trial, defendant was convicted of intentionally or knowingly
causing the death of Don Newingham (Count I) and was acquitted of
intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Shayne Newingham
(Count II) (R. 193-95).

Defendant waived hearing before the jury

in the sentencing proceedings (T. 1414-15).

The trial court

sentenced defendant to life imprisonment, and further imposed an
enhancement of twenty years imprisonment pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992) (Findings of Fact and Conclusions
1

The 1991 amendment to section 76-5-202 eliminated the
"first degree" designation. The level of murder is now called
"aggravated murder."

4

Re: Imposition of Sentence and Applicability of § 76-3-203.1
U.C.A., R. 344-48, attached at Addendum B; Judgment, Commitment
and Sentence, R. 352, attached at Addendum C).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Friday, June 8, 1990, defendant and fifteen to
twenty juveniles were at the home of Kim and Richard Gabaldon,
where defendant and his companions were partying and drinking
beer and tequila (T. 604-616).

At about 12:00 midnight, Kenny

Salas, Paul Velasquez, Robert Rivas, Don Newingham and Shayne
Newingham, having heard of the party from a friend of Salas,
drove in Velasquez's car to the Gabaldon residence (T. 618, 865,
872).

Both Don and Shayne, along with Salas, had earlier drunk

beer, vodka and snorted cocaine (T. 864).
Upon arriving at the Gabaldon residence, Kenny and Don
walked toward the front door of the house.

At the same time

those within the house, including Richie Gabaldon, Manuel
Martinez, Manuel Alvarez, Tony DeHerrera and defendant, moved
toward the door to see who was approaching (T. 619-21, 874, 91922, 1262-63).

Salas, who both Gabaldon and defendant knew,

inquired whether his friend was at the party and whether they
could join in (T. 619-24, 922-23).

Gabaldon refused, saying that

he did not want Don, a stranger, in his house (T. 624). Don and
Gabaldon argued back and forth, when suddenly defendant pulled
out a large-bladed knife and ordered them to leave (T. 623-25,
629-31, 923-24, 1263).
Don was at first still reluctant to leave, but then

5

responded to Salas's pulling at his arm (T. 631). Defendant and
Gabaldon, with fifteen to twenty people behind them, followed
Salas and Don to the car (T. 631-35, 876, 925). As defendant
approached the car he saw Velasquez, with whom he was also
friendly, greeted him by putting his arm around his shoulder, and
suggested that he return to the party when he had taken the
Newinghams home (T. 878-80, 1264-65).

Meanwhile, as Don got back

into the car, he muttered, "I'm not going to let no little punk
stick me," whereupon Gabaldon got into an argument with him and
punched him in the face (T. 636, 636, 876-80, 926-27, 950).
Don quickly wrestled Gabaldon to the ground (T. 927).
According to Salas and Velasquez, defendant immediately ran
around the car, jumped on Don's back and stabbed him deeply in
the back about four times (T. 881-87, 924-28).

Don jerked

defendant off his back, and defendant stabbed himself in the leg
while falling back (T. 928). In the course of this attack
everybody started running toward the car (T. 950-51).
went down, people were kicking and punching him.

As Don

Don's blood was

all over his back and Salas's shirt as Salas tried to pick Don up
and cover him in the midst of this attack, helped by Gina Silva,
one of the girls attending the party (T. 886, 929-30, 1178-80).
As soon as the first punch was thrown at his father,
Shayne Newingham jumped out to help, yelling words to the effect,
"Don't mess with my dad" (T. 645, 883, 950-51, 1038).

He was

confronted by Gabaldon, Manuel Alvarez, Manuel Martinez, Tony
DeHerrera and Fernando Negrete, and he began fighting with all of
6

them (T. 884-85, 935, 950-51, 1037, 1071, 1160).

Velasquez then

saw defendant run around and stab Shayne just as he had Don (T.
886-87).

Shayne went down in about 10 seconds, almost at the

same time as Don, whereupon Gabaldon, DeHerrera and Manuel
Alvarez kicked and stomped him in the head (T. 886-87, 929-30,
952, 1106, 1180, 1219-23, 1229-30).
The entire fight lasted about five minutes (T. 582).
Gabaldon testified that the entire episode happened "so fast"
that he believed the victims had only been knocked out, but he
admitted kicking Shayne and then stomping Don in the face as he
lay face up on the ground while Gabaldon's sister, Kim, implored
him to stop, yelling, "Leave him alone.
647-56).

You're killing him" (T.

At trial, Gabaldon's right Converse shoe with Don's

blood on its sole, State's exhibit #30, was received in evidence
(T. 653, 672, 828-29).

While at the hospital, Salt Lake City

Police Officer Randall Hunnewell observed and photographed a
shoeprint on Don's forehead (State's Ex. #7; T. 757).
Rivas and Velasquez testified that right after Don and
Shayne had dropped to the ground, Gabaldon said, "Get those white
people out of here" (T. 888, 952). Defendant was helped into the
house by two girls that had attended the party (T. 652). Gina
Silva ran into the house to get towels when she saw Shayne's
bloody back while he was still standing, and then told Kim
Gabaldon to call for an ambulance.

When she exited the house she

found both Newinghams down on the ground (T. 1179-80).
Martinez rejected Salas's request that he help him with
7

the Newinghams, and took off with Negrete (T. 1074),

Salas

remained with Don and Shayne while Velasquez and Rivas drove to a
nearby 7-Eleven store (T. 888-89)-

While Velasquez called for an

ambulance, Gabaldon drove by in the company of defendant,
DeHerrera and Manuel Alvarez. According to both Gabaldon and
Velasquez, defendant, while attempting to exit from the moving
car, called out words to the effect, "I'm going to get you next."
However, Gabaldon pulled defendant back in, and the party
continued on its way to LDS Hospital (T. 665-70, 890-92).

Later,

both Don and Shayne were also taken to LDS Hospital (T. 756).
Defendant claimed that the fight broke out as he was
talking with Velasquez.

He then ran towards the rear of the car

when he saw the glare of Don's knife coming at him.
back, stuck up his leg and got stabbed.

He jumped

He then reached for his

knife and started swinging it keep Don away (T. 1265-66, 130405).

He admitted it was possible that he might have stabbed Don

once, but that he did not intend to kill anyone and that Salas
and Velasquez were lying about how he stabbed the Newinghams (T.
1266, 1326-27, 1338-39).

However, Andrew Duggar, defendant's

cellmate following the preliminary hearing, testified that
defendant had admitted to him that he had stabbed Don and that he
was not sure if he had stabbed Shayne (T. 846).
Eight witnesses for the defense, all present at the
fight, collectively testified that: (1) they did not see
defendant in the course of the fight (T. 1094, 1126, 1141); (2)
they did not see defendant with a knife (T. 1041); (3) they did
8

not see defendant stab anyone (T. 1070, 1105, 1258); (4) they did
not see either of the victims stabbed (T. 1036, 1125, 1163, 1188,
1258); (5) they saw no blood (T. 1067, 1094); and (6) they did
not see anybody with a knife (T. 1141).

Instead, five of these

witnesses collectively testified that Tony DeHerrera had offered
one of them the use of a knife during the fight (T. 1032), held
bloody knives following the fight (T. 1129-30), sought to have
the knives hidden following the fight (T. 1143) and admitted to
stabbing at least one of the victims (T. 1055, 1097, 1109, 1114,
1143).

Anthony Valerio testified that he saw DeHerrera stab

Shayne (T. 1236, 1256).
In searching the Gabaldons' home, Salt Lake City Police
Officer John Campbell located in a washing machine a blackhandled buck knife which appeared to have been secreted beneath
some wet clothing (State's Ex. #24; T. 768-70).

Utah Crime Lab

serologist Pilar Shortsleeve identified human blood on the blade
of the knife (T. 813). Salas and Velasquez both identified the
knife as that which defendant used in stabbing the Newinghams (T.
882, 924). A small pocket knife, State's exhibit #14, was
retrieved from Don's levis pants pocket.

The knife was closed

and covered with blood later identified as Don's (T. 735, 830).
Dr. Todd Gray, Chief Medical Examiner for the State of
Utah, performed autopsies on both Don's and Shayne's bodies (T.
965).

Shayne was stabbed once in the armpit and three times in

the back.

Two of the wounds were to a depth of about six inches,

and one of the wounds indicated that the knife had been
9

reinserted after it had been partially withdrawn.

Abrasion marks

from the hilt of the knife suggested the force with which the
blow was struck (T. 865-72).

Don was stabbed three times in the

back, even more deeply, one of the thrusts leaving a gaping wound
(T. 991-999).

Both Newinghams died of multiple stab wounds,

consistent with State's exhibit #24 (T. 983, 990, 1002-03).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant failed to preserve for review his claims that
(1) the process of "death qualification" of the jury venire
violates the Utah Constitution, (2) in response to an inquiry,
the trial court misled the jury concerning the elements of first
degree murder and (3) Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203.1 (Supp. 1990),
also known as the "gang enhancement," under which defendant was
partially sentenced, is unconstitutional in various respects and
was improperly applied.

Motions made in support of these claims

only nominally alluded, if at all, to the full range of arguments
now made for the first time on appeal.

By failing to make these

claims in the trial court, defendant deprived the court of the
opportunity to rule on the merits of his arguments.
the death penalty was not imposed.

In this case

Thus, this Court should

decline to review defendant's inadequately preserved claims.
POINT II
Defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the
prosecution had used two of its peremptory challenges against
alleged Hispanic jurors solely on account of race, a necessary
10

threshold in successfully maintaining a case under Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).

Defendant never

established on the record that the stricken jurors were, in fact,
Hispanic, or that striking two out of four such persons from the
pattern demonstrated a discriminatory pattern of peremptory
strikes.
The trial court ruled that defendant had failed to make
a prima facie case.

Only after the court had made the ruling did

the prosecution tender its race-neutral reasons, which rebutted
any inference that the strikes were exercised on account of race.
Rather, the prosecution adequately showed that the strikes were
made on the basis of the juror's bias against the interests of
the State.
POINT III
The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
verdict that defendant had committed the first degree murder of
Don Newingham, incident to the killing of Shayne Newingham in the
course of one criminal episode.

The homicides took place within

moments of each other in the same location, all in the course of
defendant, and his cohorts, acting to accomplish the single
criminal objective of ejecting the victims from the premises with
unlawful force.

There was sufficient evidence to prove that

defendant was principal in Shayne's fatal stabbing.

Defendant's

acquittal of that crime in the face of his conviction for an
offense requiring two homicides is merely an inconsistency in the
verdicts about which the Court can only speculate.

11

This

conclusion holds good even if defendant must be shown to have
been an accomplice and even in spite of an apparent inconsistency
in defendant's having been acquitted of the killing of Shayne
Newingham.
POINT IV
The trial court's findings, under the gang enhancement
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992), that defendant
acted in concert with two or more persons in committing murder
were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.

The

evidence established that at least two other of defendant's
companions could have been convicted of first degree murder, even
though they were not.

However, such a showing is not even

required under the statute.

Rather, the statute makes the

enhancement applicable in situations where two or more persons,
other than the principal actor, could be found guilty of lesser
crimes, which was clearly demonstrated by the record in this
case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S
CLAIMS CONCERNING (1) THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE DEATH QUALIFICATION UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, (2) THE TRIAL COURT'S RESPONSE
TO A JURY INQUIRY ABOUT THE ELEMENTS OF FIRST
DEGREE MURDER AND (3) THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992)
BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.
Defendant claims on appeal that (1) the process of
"death qualification" of the jury venire violates the Utah
Constitution, (2) in response to an inquiry, the trial court
12

misled the jury concerning the elements of first degree murder
and (3) Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203-1 (Supp. 1990), also known as
the "gang enhancement," under which defendant was partially
sentenced, is unconstitutional in various respects and was
improperly applied (Appellant's Brief at Points I, IV and V,
respectively).

None of these claims was sufficiently preserved

for appeal.
A.

Claims Either Omitted or Only
Nominally Made are Insufficiently
Preserved for Appeal and Should
Not be Reviewed on Their Merits.
Concerning the preservation of arguments for appeal,

this Court has repeatedly stated:
"A general rule of appellate review in
criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such
claim on appeal." Importantly, the grounds
for the objection must be distinctly and
specifically stated.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) (citations
omitted) (declining to review a general motion to dismiss an
element of the offense because the asserted grounds "were not
specifically or distinctly stated to the court below").2
This general rule applies equally to constitutional

2

This Court has recognized an exception to the waiver rule
in capital cases where the death penalty has been imposed,
recognizing "the serious and permanent nature of the penalty
imposed in such cases." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551-52
(Utah 1987). Defendant was convicted of a capital crime, but did
not receive the death penalty; therefore, the exception does not
apply.
13

arguments raised for the first time on appeal.
Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990).

State v.

This Court has frequently

found that defendants have waived constitutional rights by
failing to assert them in the trial court.

Among the rights that

defendants have waived are the right to a public trial, State v.
Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah 1989) ("failure of a
defendant and his or her counsel to object to a closure order
constitutes waiver of the defendant's right to a public trial
under both the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution"), cert.
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (1991); the right to a speedy trial, State
v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Utah 1984) ("[t]his Court has
held that a defendant who has not asserted his or her right to a
speedy trial in the lower court has waived the right to raise the
issue on appeal"); the right to object to a prosecutor's comments
on a defendant's failure to testify, State v. Hales, 652 P.2d
1290, 1292 (Utah 1982) ("we are precluded from reaching the issue
of their [prosecutor's comments] constitutionality by defendant's
failure to object to them at trial"); and the right to challenge
evidence that should have been suppressed, State v. Lee, 633 P.2d
48, 53 (Utah) ("[The waiver] rule is particularly applicable to
motions to suppress which should be supported by precise
averments, not conclusory allegations* . . . [T]here is no
justification for not presenting all available grounds in support
of a motion to suppress . . . • [A]n appellate court will not
rule on grounds not addressed in the trial court"), cert, denied
14

454 U.S. 1057, 102 S. Ct. 606 (1981).
"Absent a timely objection, [a reviewing court] will
review an alleged error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e.,
only if it constitutes 'plain error.'"

State v. Whittle, 780

P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989) (refusing to consider a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct not raised in the trial court and which
was not plain error) (citations omitted).

Except in "exceptional

circumstances" a reviewing court will not entertain a claim
raised for the first time on appeal.

Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d

1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, Jolivet v. Barnes, 493 U.S. 1033,
110 S. Ct. 751 (1990).3
"One of the primary reasons for imposing waiver rules
like rule 103(a)(1)[, Utah Rules of Evidence,] is to assure that
the trial court has the first opportunity to address a claim that
it erred."

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991)

(considering an issue not raised at trial because the trial
court, in a motion for a new trial, addressed the issue fully and
did not rely on waiver).

See also Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292

3

In this case there has been no allegation of plain error
or exceptional circumstances which would have prevented defendant
from presenting any of his claims at trial which he now asserts
on appeal. Further, none of the errors claimed on appeal which
the State asserts have been insufficiently preserved is obvious
on the face of the record: The death-qualified jury has been
approved by this Court in State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah
1988), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, Laffertv v. Cook,
949 P.2d 1546 (10 Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1942
(1992); defendant admits on appeal that jury instruction #11
correctly instructs the jury on the elements of first degree
murder (Appellant's Brief at 37); and the trial court had a right
to assume that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1990) was
constitutional, particularly in the absence of any supporting
argument from defendant.
15

(refusing to consider a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, which
this Court clearly regarded as meritorious, partly because the
"trial court had no opportunity to rule on [the] matter and
correct any of the alleged errors").
Similarly, the trial court is also effectively denied
the opportunity to intelligibly rule in favor of a defendant or
correct alleged errors when the defendant only nominally asserts
an objection.

In such circumstances the trial court is not

presented with a substantial argument on which it can target a
response.

In State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982), this

Court refused to consider the defendant's claim that "mug shots"
were improperly admitted, even though the claim had merit,
because the objection at trial was based on lack of foundation
rather than prejudice, the grounds asserted on appeal.

In so

ruling, this Court cited with approval State v. Moore, 543 P.2d
923 (Kan. 1975), wherein the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
general objection, "Improper," to the prosecutor's attempt to
introduce evidence of a prior conviction was insufficient because
the defendant did not clearly state the specific grounds of his
objection and did not identify what action he wished the court to
take.

McCardell, 652 P.2d at 947.

See also State v. Elm, 808

P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah 1991) (holding that a general
objection is insufficient to preserve specific claims on appeal.
In State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), this Court
refused to consider the defendant's only nominally made state
constitutional claims where the defendant had actually relied on
16

parallel federal provisions. Id. at 1247 n.5.
The Utah Court of Appeals has generally held that
claims made under the Utah Constitution, only nominally raised in
the trial court, are not adequately preserved for appeal and are
thereby waived.

See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah

App. 1989) (holding that "nominally alluding" to article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as an independent ground for
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, "without any
analysis before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the
issue to permit consideration by this court on appeal"), rev'd on
other grounds. State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991); State
v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah App. 1991) (same); State v.
Miller, 829 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App. 1992) (merely citing in a
motion to suppress a case in which remand was based on article I,
section 12 of the Utah Constitution, alleged by the defendant on
appeal to provide greater protection than the United States
Constitution, was insufficient to preserve the matter for
appeal), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah).
B.

Defendant's Motion to Preclude
Death-Qualification of the Jury
Venire Made Only Nominal Allusion
to the Utah Constitution.
Defendant's entire argument in his Motion to Preclude

Death Qualification of the Jury Venire was that the death
qualification of a jury Mden[ies] him of [sic] the right to a
fair trial, in violation of Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution and of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution" (R. 129, attached at Addendum D). The motion was
17

not accompanied by any supporting memorandum.

Defendant failed

to argue his claim to the trial court and merely alluded to this
written motion at a hearing held on several motions, stating,
M

[T]he others have to do with the death-qualification of a jury

and asking that those that believe in blood atonement be excused
for cause at the outset and some other things that I think the
Court can address itself to" (T. of Nov. 5, 1990 hearing, R. 376
at 7). Defendant never mentioned article I, sections 9 and 10 of
the Utah Constitution at any point in the proceedings below.
Further, the State addressed the death-qualification issue in its
responsive memorandum and before the trial court only on federal
constitutional grounds (R. 126-27; T. of Nov. 5, 1990 hearing, R.
376 at 8-9). Defendant, however, did not even attempt to direct
the trial court's attention to a state constitutional argument,
and thus effectively abandoned the issue.
This Court has announced its willingness to entertain
separate analyses under the Utah Constitution in criminal cases.
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986).

However, it should

not entertain such analysis without requiring counsel to initiate
that analysis at the trial level. This view finds support in
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985), which this Court has
cited as a guide for state constitutional analysis.
P.2d at 806.

Earl, 716

In Jewett, the Vermont Supreme Court stated, "it is

the duty of the advocate to raise state constitutional issues,
where appropriate, at the trial level and to diligently develop
and plausibly maintain them on appeal."
18

500 A.2d at 238

(emphasis added).

While defendant has presented this Court with

a lengthy state constitutional argument on appeal, he utterly
failed to raise the same constitutional issues in a manner that
would have allowed the trial court to intelligently reflect upon
them and has thereby waived consideration of those issues on
appeal•
C.

Defendant Failed to Object to
the Trial Court's Response to
a Jury Inquiry Concerning the
Elements of First Degree Murder,
Defendant's assertion that the trial court incorrectly

instructed the jury on the elements of first degree murder is
based on a misreading of the record.

In fact, defendant's

assertion on appeal presumes an objection which was never made in
the trial court.

Defendant has therefore waived this Court's

consideration of that issue.

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange,

817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991).
On appeal defendant develops the argument that the jury
was mistakenly instructed on the elements of first degree murder
so that it was only required to find that two persons were killed
(Appellant's Brief, Point IV at 39). This argument hinges on the
trial court's response to the second of two jury inquiries
requesting clarification of the meaning of jury instruction #11,
which sets forth the elements required to convict defendant of
the first degree murder of Don Newingham (Jury Instruction #11,
R. 303, attached at Addendum E).
The first written inquiry appearing in the record was:
"In order to find defendant guilty of 1st degree murder do we
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have to find him guilty of both murders?" (R. 196, attached at
Addendum F). The court responded to this question after
consulting with defendant and the prosecutor (T. 1,406-08).

The

court correctly directed the jurors' attention to other
instructions to answer this question/

Both defendant and the

prosecutor stipulated to the trial court's response, defendant
reserving his objection to the trial court's interpretation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(b) (1990), that interpretation being
that the statute does not require that the same actor commit both
murders (T. 1407).

However, nowhere on appeal does defendant

renew his claim that the statute requires that an actor commit
both murders.
The second written inquiry appearing of record was:
"In Instruction #11 element #3.

Do you need to satisfy all the

elements or just one[?]" (Attached at Addendum F, R. 200). The
court responded, "Any single element set forth in paragraph No. 3
of Instruction No. 11 is sufficient" (R. 200). It is this
response that defendant considers the real locus of the
prejudicial error because, in his view, it relieves the jury from
also finding that the "homicide was committed incident to one
act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode" (Appellant's
Brief at 39 n.25).

However, there is no objection to this

* The court responded, "You're first directed to Instruction
No. Six. The elements of the offense are contained in
Instruction 11 for Count 1 and Instruction 12 for Count 2. The
definitions for these instructions are contained in Instructions
No. 13, 15 and 18. By reviewing these instructions, you should
be able to answer that question" (T. 1,407 and R. 196).
20

response in the record.

Since there was neither an objection to

this response, nor anything of record to indicate that defendant
was not consulted during the trial regarding the court's response
to this initial jury question,5 defendant has waived this
Court's review of that issue.
While defendant's objection to the court's
interpretation, i.e., that section 76-5-202(1)(b) does not
require that the actor commit both murders, preserved that issue
for appeal, it was insufficient to preserve what defendant now
argues on appeal, that on account of the trial court's response
to the second inquiry the jury need not have found that the
homicide was committed incident to any of the four alternative
circumstances set forth in the statute.

Even if the issue were

preserved, the meaning defendant suggests the jury might have
garnered from the trial court's response is absurd, i.e., that
none of the four incidental circumstances (one act, scheme,
course of conduct or criminal episode) should be considered and
that they merely need find that two killings occurred.

Such a

reading is a simple denial of the plain language requirements of
the statute and the instruction.
In State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah), cert, denied, 454 U.S.
1057, 102 S. Ct. 606 (1981), the defendant argued in a
suppression hearing that the initial viewing of stolen goods in a
5

The prosecutor specifically stated, w[W]e would ask for
further instruction if there is another question on the same
issue" (T. 1,407). From this statement it can be reasonably
inferred that since no further discussions on this issue appear
of record, none occurred.
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truck was an unlawful search.

On appeal, the defendant made the

additional, somewhat related argument, that regardless of the
lawfulness of the search, the seizure was itself unlawful.

This

Court declined to review the unlawful seizure claim, indicating
that the defendant bore the burden of presenting "all available
grounds in support of a motion to suppress" and that such motions
"should be supported by precise averments."

id. at 53.

This

Court further concluded:
There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the point now urged upon this
Court was unavailable or unknown to defendant
at the time he filed his motion to suppress,
and to entertain the point now would be to
sanction the practice of withholding
arguments that should properly be presented
to the trial court for the purpose of seeking
a reversal on appeal and a new trial or
dismissal.
Ibid.

Accord State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 600-01 (Utah 1985)

(refusing to consider a claim of warrantless search of a backpack
where only an unlawful stop and frisk were argued at a
suppression hearing).

Because defendant failed to preserve his

objection to the trial court's response to the second jury
inquiry, this Court should decline to address his argument on
appeal.
D.

Defendant Either Omitted or Only
Nominally Alluded to Claims Made
on Appeal that Section 76-3-203.1
is Unconstitutional and Creates a
New Crime.
On appeal defendant makes a barrage of challenges to

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992), commonly referred to as
the "gang enhancement," under both the Utah and United States
22

Constitutions,
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objection

to the enhancement.

At that hearing defendant merely asserted,

"[w]ith respect to the enhancement—gang enhancement. . . . I
think that I need to perfect the record in behalf of Mr. Alvarez
in that regard.

There are Constitutional arguments thatneed

[sic] to be preserved regarding vagueness in the relegation of
legislative function to the Judicial and Executive branches and
applying Federal standards 76-3-203.1, Federal and State
constitutional standards 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional." (T.
1,422).

Defendant's other references to the sentencing

enhancement bear only on his complaint that the circuit court
judge failed to make findings of fact showing that others had
participated with defendant, in effect an insufficiency of
evidence claim directed at the preliminary hearing level (T. of
Nov. 5, 1990 hearing, R. 376 at 4-7). None of defendant's
remarks on this point bear on the federal and state
constitutional and statutory arguments defendant raises on
appeal.
An almost identical general objection was held a waiver in
Elm, 808 P.2d at 1099-1100.

In Elm, the objection was: "Your

Honor, just for the purpose of the record, may we express our
objection to the sentencing so we may be able to preserve that
for purposes of appeal?" Id. at 1100. This Court found that the
defendant had waived any specific claims of defects to the
sentencing on the ground that counsel's general objection was
inadequate.

Ibid.
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Only defendant's claim that the trial court's findings
that defendant acted in concert with two or more persons under
section 76-3-203.1 is properly before this Court on appeal
(Appellant's Brief at: 52-55)
That i ssi :ie i s addressed at Point
IV of this brief.

POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILED TO MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CASE
THAT THE STATE USED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO
STRIKE TWO HISPANIC JURORS FOR OTHER THAN
RACE NEUTRAL REASONS; EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE
TO FIND THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE HAD BEEN
MADE, IT WOULD FIND THE STATE'S REASONS
ADEQUATE.
Following voir dire of the jury and prior to the
swearing of the panel, defendantf a Hispanic, challenged the
panel on the ground the State used its peremptory challenges to
strike two Hispanic jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517
(Utah 1989) ("Cantu II'M, and State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah
1991) (Appellant's Brief, Point II at 22; T. 515-17).
A.

The Prima Facie Case Standards.
In Batson. the United States Supreme Court ruled it an

equal protection violation for a prosecutor to use a peremptory
challenge to exclude prospective jury members solely on the basis
of race.

Id., at 79.

Since Batson, this Court has modified the

showing required of a defendant to initially attack a peremptory
challenge allegedly made in violation of his fourteenth amendment
rights;
The party attacking a peremptory challenge
must establish a prima facie case. rCantu I,
750 P.2d at 595] (citing Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986)).

The elements necessary to such a prima facie
case include (1) as complete a record as
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possible, (2) a showing that persons excluded
belong to a cognizable group under 7 the
representative cross-section r rule, and (3)
a showing that there exists a strong
likelihood that such persons are being
challenged because of their group association
rather than because of any specific bias.'
People v, Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 280, 281, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 905, 583 P.2d 748, 764
(1978) .
Cantu 1 I , " ; I! at fj. I Fl (citations om.i1 foil) (emphasis added)

The

Court also set. out the pattern ut shifting burdens, uleni i
Batsor
p

4 76 ILLS

"ILM! n IB, to be followed by the parties i n

- - i, i in 'fji i Bat son r 11 -in III! Il e n q e :
[Once the party attacking a peremptorychallenge has established a prima facie
case,] [t]he burden then shifts to the
challenged party to show the existence of a
racially neutral reason for the challenge.
Id. at 595. A determination as to whether
the evidence rebuts the prima facie case
generally turns on evaluation of witness
credibility. United States v. David, 844
F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir. 1988).

Id. at 518.

7

In Span ,,• this Court clari fied the standard for assessing
"cognizability" for equal protection purposes, which had been
left somewhat confused by citation in State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d.
591 P.2d (Utah 1988) ("Cantu I"\. to cases relying on different
constitutional bases in characterizing "cognizability." See
Span, 819 P.2d at 340-342. In selecting the analysis adopted In
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977), wh ii ch
was specifically cited Batson, this Court clearly rejected the
representative cross-section analysis advanced by People v.
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), and People v. Fields, 732 P m2d
1145 (Colo. 1987), for equal protection purposes. Thus,
m\
1
seem that the phrase, "a cognizable group under the
representative cross-section rule," as it appears in Cantu II at
518, should be replaced by the term "any group that is a
recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treat mi :
under the laws, as written or as applied," the definition
announced in Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494, and adopted by this
Court i n Span r 819 P.2d at 341.

A number of courts have determined a prima facie case
to be a necessary threshold showing before the burden shifts to
the government to explain its race neutral reasons for using its
peremptory strikes in the allegedly discriminatory fashion.

In

United States v. Youhq-Bev, 893 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1990), the
court found that the government's striking of two blacks from the
panel, without a further showing that the use of the peremptories
gave rise to an inference that the prospective jurors were struck
because of their race, was insufficient to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under Batson, "and that the
government was thus not required to state its reasons for
peremptorily challenging the two black venirepersons."
181.

id. at

In United States v. Malindez, 962 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.),

cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 215 (1992) focussing on the shifting
burdens scheme laid out in Batson, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding that the government was not required
to come forward with race-neutral reasons where the defendant had
failed to establish a prima facie case based only on the
government's using four of its eight peremptory strikes against
blacks.

The Court noted:

"The purpose of the prima

facie

case

requirement is to separate meritless claims of discrimination
from those that may have merit."

JEd. at 334 (citing Texas Dept.

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S. Ct.
189, 1093-94 (1981)8.

See also Hansel v. Public Service Co. of

8

Batson expressly identified Title VII case law as a source
for "prima facie burden of proof rules" to be applied to the
analysis of peremptory juror challenges, see 476 U.S. at 94 n.18,
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Colorado, 778 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding in a
Title VII case that if the plaintiff could not prove the prima
facie elements of job discrimination, then the burden of proof
did not shift to the defendant to show legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for allegedly differential treatment).
In this case the jury venire consisted of seventy-seven
persons.

Fourteen were excused for cause, and both defendant and

the State exercised twelve peremptory challenges (R. 223-26).
Four of the venirepersons had Hispanic surnames.

There was also

a venireperson, Joan Anderson, juror #42, who appeared Hispanic
to defendant and whom defendant struck with his eighth peremptory
challenge (R. 225; T. 521). The trial court struck Madalyn
Ramos, juror #10, for cause (R. 223). Of the remaining three
jurors with Hispanic surnames, the prosecutor struck two, Annie
Sanchez, juror #46, and Wendy Mayeda, juror #21, with his first
and fifth peremptory challenge, respectively.
At trial, defendant, failing to recall that he had also
removed an alleged Hispanic, charged the prosecution with a
Batson violation solely on account of its removal of two out of
three Hispanics from the panel (T. 515-16).

When asked by the

trial court as to whether the challenged jurors were, in fact,
Hispanic, defendant answered, "She [Wendy Mayeda] appears to be
Hispanic and has a Hispanic name.

That's all I can do" (T. 519)

a fact noted in State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah App.
1991).
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(emphasis added).9

On appeal, defendant urges that this Court

find that he established a prima facie case on nothing more than
his assertion that the prosecutor struck 67 percent of the
potential Hispanic jurors and that the minority jurors stricken
were of the same race as he (Appellant's Brief at 24-25).

Such a

limited showing by a Batson proponent is not sufficient to make a
prima facie case through either "a showing that persons excluded
belong to a cognizable group," or "that there exists 'a strong
likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of
their group association rather than because of any specific
bias.'"
B.

Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (Appellee's Brief at 26-27).
Cognizabilitv of Excluded Jurors.
"The burden of establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination lies with the defendant."
595.

Cantu I, 750 P.2d at

The first requirement of the prima facie case is to bring

forward as complete a record as possible.

Cantu II. 778 P.2d at

518.
In this case defendant never established that Sanchez
and Mayeda were, in fact, Hispanics.

During the course of the

proceedings, the trial court discussed the difficulty of applying
the Batson challenge when the ancestry, and consequently the
group affiliation, of the excluded jurors had not been
established (T. 518-19).

The validity of this inquiry was made

more apparent when defendant acknowledged that he had excluded

9

The complete colloquy amongst the trial court and the
parties is attached at Addendum H.
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Anderson, juror #42, who appeared Hispanic to him, but neither
he, the prosecutor nor the trial court could agree that she was
Hispanic, based on appearance (T. 518). Defendant never asked to
recall the excluded jurors to determine with certainty their
group affiliation, in spite of his having anticipated bringing a
Batson challenge the day before the parties exercised their
peremptories and in spite of the entire panel's still being
available when the challenge was made the following day (T. 48893, 513-14).

Contrary to defendant's assertion (Appellant's

Brief at 24 n.15), neither the trial court nor the prosecutor
ever acknowledged that Sanchez and Mayeda were actually
Hispanics, but rather proceeded as though they were in deference
to defendant's challenge (T. 519-23).
In United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir.
1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. (1992), the court found the
defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case under
Batson, where the prosecution had used four of its six peremptory
challenges and its one challenge against an alternate juror to
strike Hispanic members of the panel. A central component of the
court's finding was defendant's failure "to establish with
certainty the racial identity of the venire members struck by the
prosecution."

Ld. at 1466.

The court noted that while

appearance and surnames may provide a plausible inference as to
group identity, it could not sustain a Batson challenge on
conjecture.

Ibid.

Further, the court distinguished Castaneda,

relied on for the proposition that "all persons of Spanish
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language or Spanish surname were Mexican-Americans . . . ,"
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 486, noting that in Castaneda, the Court
"had relied on official census categorizations rather than
counsel's surmises about names and their racial significance."
Esparsen, 930 F.2d at 1467.
In Span, the Court stated:

"Under any legitimate

theory asserted by a defendant that a prosecutor has
unconstitutionally discriminated in the use of a peremptory
challenge, a defendant must demonstrate that the excluded
prospective juror was a member of a cognizable minority group."
819 P.2d at 340 (emphasis added).

But see Harrison, 805 P.2d at

777 n.9 (recognizing that while minority status cannot be
established solely from one's surname, "concrete proof of the
actual race of the jurors so challenged is, at most, of secondary
importance").
Further, this case is distinguishable from both
Cantu I, where two justices of this Court found that a prima
facie case was made, and Harrison, where the court of appeals
also found that a prima facie case had been made.

In Cantu I,

the excluded juror acknowledged that he was of Hispanic ancestry,
750 P.2d at 596, and in Harrison, the trial court observed that
the jurors in question appeared to be members of racial
minorities.

805 P.2d at 777. No such showing of racial identity

was made in this case.
In Wheeler, a pre-Batson case cited by this Court for
the appropriate prima facie test, the defendant, apparently
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recognizing that the prosecution was using every one of its
peremptory challenges to strike black members of the panel,
established a record of each black panel member's racial identity
as soon as he became aware of the pattern of prosecution strikes.
The court stated that "when an issue of this nature does arise in
any case it is incumbent upon counsel, however delicate the
matter, to make a record sufficient to preserve the point for
review."

583 P.2d at 752 (emphasis added).

As noted above,

defendant failed to undertake the simple exercise of having the
excluded jurors recalled to determine the precise character of
their racial identity and thereby failed to establish a prima
facie case of cognizability.
Integrally related to making a secure determination of
the excluded jurors racial identity, is the second element of the
Cantu II test, that such persons be members of a "cognizable
group."

While Cantu I and Harrison would appear to have settled

that Hispanics do comprise such a group, this Court's decision in
Span suggests that the matter is not finally determined.

In

clarifying the term, "cognizability," Span nonetheless did not
reject Tillman's citation to Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
479, 74 S. Ct. 667, 671 (1954), where the United States Supreme
Court noted that whether [Hispanics] did in fact exist as a
distinct group was a question of fact in any given community.
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 575 n.125.

Thus, whether Hispanics are, in

fact, such a "cognizable group" in Salt Lake City would still
appear to be an open question.
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The trial court never made a finding on whether
Hispanics in Salt Lake City are a "cognizable group," first,
because it was uncertain that the excluded panel members belonged
to such a group, and second, because it obviously did not think
the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes, based on the
resultant representation of presumed Hispanics on the jury, was
discriminatory (T. 518-22).

In this case defendant had an

opportunity to demonstrate both the group affiliation of the
excluded jurors and the cognizability of Hispanics within the
community.

He failed to do either.

Thus, unlike the defendant

in Span, who was deprived of an opportunity to show that an
individual who appeared to be Vietnamese belonged to a cognizable
group because of the trial court's erroneous ruling that his
Batson challenge was untimely, defendant in this case should not
be permitted to return to the trial court to establish a prima
facie case.
C.

Defendant Failed to Show a "Strong
Likelihood" that Aligned Minority
Jurors were Struck from the Panel
Because of Their Group Association
Rather than Because of any Specific
Bias.
In Batson, the Court identified several avenues by

which a prima facie case might be made, one of which was the
showing of a "pattern" of strikes against the minority jurors in
the venire. J[d. at 97.
"While a single challenge based on race is
impermissible, the mere fact that the subject of the peremptory
strike is a minority member does not alone raise the inference of
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discriminatory intent.

'[I]t is not unconstitutional, without

more, to strike one or more [Hispanics] from the jury.'"
Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597 (citations omitted).

In order to make a

prima facie case, "[t]he facts and circumstances surrounding the
use of the challenge must raise the inference that the
prosecution used the peremptory challenges to exclude a person
from the petit jury on account of his or her race,"

Ibid.

In this case defendant relied only on the bare fact
that the prosecution struck two out of four alleged Hispanic
jurors, i.e., fifty percent.

In Malindez, the court found that

the prosecution's striking the same percentage, without an offer
by the defendant of any other evidence in support of a prima
facie case, was insufficient to support a Batson challenge.
Malindez, 962 F.2d. at 333 n.3.

In United States v. Brown, 941

F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1991), the court summarily struck down a
Batson challenge, stating:

"While numbers may be important, '<a

defendant who requests a prima facie finding of purposeful
discrimination is obligated to develop Tsomel record, beyond
numbers, in support of the asserted violation.'"
(emphasis added).

.Ici. at 659

In Ross v. State, 406 S.E.2d 101 (Ga. App.

1991), the court found the defendant had not made a prima facie
case where the proportion of blacks on the selected jury was
identical to that on the panel, even though the State had used
peremptory strikes to disqualify five of the seven black members
of the jury panel.

In this case the panel consisted of seventy-

seven persons, four (and possibly five) of whom were Hispanic,
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i.e., between approximately five and six percent of the venire.
Following the parties' peremptory strikes, approximately eight
percent of the jury consisted of Hispanics, an even higher
percentage than that of the original venire.
Furthermore, the Batson proponent, having the ultimate
burden of persuasion, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18, has the
burden to develop a sufficient record in the trial court.

In

this case defendant admitted that he could do nothing more than
show that the excluded jurors had Hispanic surnames and that they
appeared, to him, to be Hispanic (T. 519). In Young-Bey, the
Fourth Circuit stated:

"Batson quite clearly requires the

defendant to present facts to the district court which raise an
inference that the blacks were struck because
Ibid, (italics in original).

of their

race.••

In rejecting the defendant's

challenge, the court noted that no such facts were presented to
the district court.

Ibid.

Following defendant's challenge, based only on the
prosecution's removal of the two alleged Hispanic jurors, the
colloquy continued:
MR. MORGAN [Prosecutor]: We're mumbling
through the first part. Where have I
systematically excluded? I have taken two
out of three.
Your Honor, make a finding that that's
systematic exclusion or not.
THE COURT:

I don't think it is.

(T. 521) (emphasis added).

Thus, before the prosecutor
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voluntarily offered his race-neutral reasons for striking Mayeda
and Sanchez, the trial court had made a finding that the
prosecution's peremptory strikes had not been made with
discriminatory intent.
On appeal, this Court should give great deference to
the trial court's factual finding that defendant failed to
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under
Batson.

United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir.),

cert, denied, 488 U.S. 923, 109 S. Ct. 304 (1988); Cantu II, 778
P.2d at 520 (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
"Findings of fact are not set aside unless clearly
erroneous."
52(a)).

Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (citing Utah R. Civ. P.

"A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed."

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-

93 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted).
In Walker, this Court further clarified the standard of
review by referring to Wright and Miller as follows:
The appellate court . . . does not consider
and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere
fact that on the same evidence the appellate
court might have reached a different result
does not justify it in setting the findings
aside. It may regard a finding as clearly
erroneous only if the finding is without
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law.
Id. at 193 (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, § 2585 (1971)).

Thus, this Court will only set aside
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a trial court's findings when they are against the clear weight
of the evidence, or if the court otherwise reaches a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
In this case the trial court was required to determine
whether, as a result of the prosecutor's exercising two of his
peremptory strikes, defendant had made a prima facie case of race
discrimination by showing there existed a strong likelihood that
alleged Hispanic venirepersons were excluded from the jury solely
on account of race.

Defendant put before the court no other

facts than that the prosecution struck two of four such persons.
On the basis of those facts, the trial court's finding that the
two jurors had not been struck on account of their race cannot be
regarded as clearly erroneous.

D.

Even if Defendant did Make a
Prima Facie Case, the Prosecution
Offered Satisfactory Race-Neutral
Reasons for Striking the Prospective
Jurors.
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant met his burden of

establishing an inference of bias, the burden then shifted to the
prosecution to provide a credible race neutral explanation for
the peremptory challenges.
P.2d at 518.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Cantu II, 778

The explanation cannot be a mere denial of

discriminatory intent; however, it need not rise to the level of
a challenge for cause.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98. Rather, a

prosecutor's explanation must be "(1) neutral, (2) related to the
case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4)
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legitimate."

Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (citations omitted).

After it had ruled that defendant had failed to show
that the prosecutor had exercised his peremptory strikes in a
discriminatory manner, the trial court suggested that the
prosecutor make a record of his race-neutral reasons for striking
the challenged jurors (T. 522). With respect to Wendy Mayeda,
the prosecutor stated:
The prosecutor's neutral non-race reasons
are as follows: Wendy Mayeda, the State took
off, Juror No. 21, for the following reasons:
She's youthful, she indicated she would be
suffering a financial hardship and she also
indicated she has personal problems and would
have difficulty in concentrating, and that
she's going through a separation, even though
she is not married at the time. She also
indicated that although she would follow the
Court's instructions with regard to the death
penalty, that she had some scruples over the
death penalty. For those reasons, the State
elected its pre-emptory [sic] challenge and
removed Wendy Mayeda from the panel.
(T. 524).
In challenging the validity of the prosecutor's
reasons, defendant relies on a list of factors that may cast
doubt upon the legitimacy of a purportedly race-neutral
explanation:
. . . (1) alleged group bias not shown to be
shared by the juror in question, (2) failure
to examine the juror or perfunctory
examination, assuming neither the trial court
nor opposing counsel had questioned the
juror, (3) singling the juror out for special
questioning designed to evoke a certain
response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is
unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a
challenge based on reasons equally applicable
to juror [sic] who were not challenged.
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Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18,
22 (Fla.), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S. Ct. 2873 (1988)).
1.

Wendy Maveda.

Specifically, defendant claims the prosecutor
discriminatorily struck Mayeda because two of the reasons he
asserted, i.e., that she was youthful (25 years old), and had
expressed scruples about applying the death penalty, could be
applied equally to other jurors against whom he had not exercised
his peremptory challenges (Appellant's Brief at 27-30).

Further,

defendant argues, the prosecutor's alleged concern with Mayeda's
expression of concern about being able to concentrate on the
trial because she was going through a separation should have been
allayed when the trial court elicited from Mayeda that she would
nonetheless try to apply her attention to the case (Appellant's
Brief at 28). Finally, defendant argues that there is no support
in the record for the prosecutor's reason for striking Mayeda on
account of financial hardship (Appellant's Brief at 30). With
the exception of this last point, which is trivial and quite
understandable in the context of Mayeda's expressed concerns
about serving on the jury, defendant's points are insufficient to
demonstrate a discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge on
this juror.
The prosecutor may ordinarily exercise peremptory
challenges "for any reason at all, as long as that reason is
related to his view concerning the outcome" of the case.
476 U.S. at 89 (citations omitted).
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Batson,

Defendant argues that the prosecutor's nonuse of
peremptory strikes against Stacy Korth, age 24, and Christine
Albrycht, age 28, demonstrated a racial bias in striking Mayeda.
However, jury selection is not based on single criteria, but
rather on a host of characteristics manifested by the prospective
jurors.

State v. Thomas, 407 S.E.2d 141, 147 (N.C. 1991) (noting

that jury selection is "more an art than a science" and in which
"[r]arely will a single factor control the decision-making
process").

Defendant neglects to mention that Korth presented

herself as an especially mature individual for a 24-year old,
i.e., a married woman, working as a registered nurse on child
abuse cases (T. 27, 55). Similarly, Christine Albrycht, age 28,
had three years of college and was working as a product
development analyst at a major corporation (T. 28). Also,
neither of these jurors expressed any concern about the
imposition of the death penalty, as did Mayeda (T. 337-42, 37480).

In fact, following the voir dire on the imposition of the

death penalty, the trial court remarked about Albrycht, "Very
forthright.

That's the kind of person that makes an excellent

juror" (T. 380).
There is no question that Mayeda presented a
significant basis for exclusion when she expressed some doubts
about being able to concentrate because she was then going
through a separation.

Defendant points to no other juror that

was similarly preoccupied.

Mayeda clearly stated that she was

having "a really hard time with trying to deal with all that" (T.
41

236 ). 10

That she said she would "try" to apply her best efforts

to the case, in response to the trial court's pressing question,
does not negate the prosecutor's legitimate doubts, even if her
concerns did not give rise to a challenge for cause.

See United

States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 849-50 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding
the government's strike against a young single mother who "might
have other concerns" an adequate race-neutral reason for striking
a black juror).
The issues of age and mental presence, however, pale
alongside the central concern in the case—the death penalty.
The examination on the prospective jurors' attitudes on this
issue comprises almost the entire voir dire, i.e., approximately
four hundred out of a total of five hundred pages (see Vols. IIII of the transcript).

Defendant suggests that because

prospective jurors Georgina Carr, Robert Galvez and Darla
Chedester expressed "some degree of concern over the death
penalty," but were not removed, the prosecutor's reasons for
striking Mayeda were not race-neutral.

The facts are otherwise.

First, none of the mentioned jurors expressed nearly
the same concern over the imposition of the death penalty that
Mayeda did.11

Car, clearly stated that her somewhat mixed

feelings would not stop her from imposing the penalty if she were
convinced that it was the only appropriate penalty (T. 265-66).

10

The voir dire of Mayeda is attached at Addendum I.

11

The voir dire of jurors Carr, Galvez and Chedester are
attached at Addenda J, K and L, respectively.
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Galvez indicated that he had "some feelings" about the imposition
of the penalty, but that it should be imposed for "mass murders"
(T. 280). The prosecutor, generally leaving the voir dire in the
trial court's hands, specifically asked Galvez if the death
penalty would be appropriate in the case of a double homicide.
Galvez answered that he could apply the penalty in such a case if
he were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt (T. 284). Chedester,
though she expressed some concern about imposing the penalty,
clearly indicated that she would be willing to apply it if she
were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt about its
appropriateness (T. 296-305).
Mayeda, on the other hand, was far more reluctant to
apply the death penalty than either Carr, Galvez or Chedester.
At the very outset she stated, "I just feel I don't have any
right to really judge or to really say if this person should be
allowed to die or live" (T. 239). When asked by the trial court
if she could impose the penalty if it were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed
the mitigating circumstances, she responded, "I don't know even
if I were convinced I could still—you know—I just—even if I
was convinced, it's still hard for me to say yes, this is what—
this is the alternative for this person, I mean" (T. 240). When
pressed again, she responded, "I don't think so" (T. 241). Only
after the trial court impressed on her that it would be her duty
to follow the court's instructions, which would include the
responsibility to impose the penalty if she were convinced beyond
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a reasonable doubt did she acquiesce, "Yes, because I have to
follow the law.

Doesn't leave me much choice" (T. 243).

Further, defendant admitted even before he made his
Batson challenge that "21 [Mayeda] was so soft on the death
penalty, I think you could take her off with a pre-emptory [sic]
challenge . . . " (T. 489-90)-

Lastly, when the prosecutor did

tender his race-neutral reasons, defendant stated, "Well, and I'm
not going to respond to 21 [Mayeda]" (T. 525). In sum, the
prosecutor's reasons for striking Mayeda were obviously raceneutral, related to the case, clear and legitimate.

See Thomas,

407 S.E.2d at 146-48 (finding a juror's never having thought
about the death penalty an adequate race-neutral reason for
striking him).
Defendant correctly points out that the prosecutor also
stated that he struck Mayeda because she said she would suffer
financial hardship if she sat on the jury, a fact not in the
record.

However, the prosecutor's assertion is a fairly

reasonable unconscious surmise about the juror's probable
financial status in the midst of a domestic breakup.

In any

event, in the face of the obvious fact that Mayeda was young,
distracted by a separation and clearly opposed to the death
penalty, this error can only be regarded as trivial.
The trial court did not make findings of fact following
the tender of the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons, but
proceeded directly to announce the jury selection to the panel
(T. 524-26).

However, whenever it would be reasonable to assume
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that the court actually made such findings based on the competent
evidence in the record and the facts are Mclear, uncontroverted,
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of [the trial
court's] judgment,,f the appellate court may review the facts
without remanding to the lower court.12

State v. Ramirez, 817

P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991).
Here, the trial court's and the prosecutor's voir dire
elicited the very reasons about which the prosecutor subsequently
expressed concern.

See Cantu fill, 778 P.2d at 519 (prosecutor's

voir dire requests relevant to a determination of his
explanation).

The prosecutor's explanations were consistent with

his questioning and consistent with the answers given.

The

reason, potential bias, is a traditional and legitimate basis for
exercising a challenge.

Cf.. Utah R. Crim. P. 18 (juror's bias is

a basis for removal for cause).

The credibility of the

prosecutor was further enhanced when he recognized that Mayeda's
responses did not justify her removal for cause, or render her a

12

An appellate court is only permitted to enter its own
factual findings where the facts are not in dispute and are
discernible from the record. Here, the prosecutor may have had
additional reasons for striking the potential jurors not
reflected in the record such as a juror's demeanor, apparent
unwillingness to serve as a juror, mental alertness, and ability
to concentrate on the proceedings. It is because of the
unrecordable nature of many legitimate reasons for exercising a
peremptory challenge that a trial court is generally in the best
position to evaluate the credibility of the prosecutor's
explanations. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. If
the prosecutor's record explanation is determined not to be
sufficient to rebut any prima facie case, this Court would be
obligated to remand to the trial court for it to determine the
race-neutrality of any other explanations which may be offered.
Span, 819 P.2d at 343; Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788.
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"bad" juror, but were simply relevant race-neutral facts
particular to her as opposed to other members of the panel.
Since the reasons expressed for exclusion were both race-neutral
and legitimate, there is no basis from which to conclude that
race was a factor in the
prosecutor's challenges of Mayeda.
2.

Annie Sanchez.

The prosecutor explained his reasons for striking
Sanchez as follows:
With respect to Annie Sanchez, Juror No,
46, the State pre-empted [sic] her for the
following neutral, non-racial reasons. She
is youthful, she's 21 years old. She seemed
to identify with the defendant during the
course of the jury voir dire. She was
constantly looking at him. She also
indicated that she had scruples against the
death penalty, even though she would follow,
she had to be talked to quite a bit in
comparison to the rest of the jurors, about
her ability to pass on the death penalty;
therefore, for those reasons, the State preempted [sic] Annie Sanchez, Juror No. 46,
using its first pre-emptory [sic] challenge.
(T. 524-25).
Defendant took issue with one of the prosecutor's
reasons:
MR. VAN SCIVER [Defense Counsel]: All right.
Seemed to identify with the defendant is the
very basis why his pre-emptory [sic] and it's
his first one.
MR. MORGAN [Prosecutor]: Good point.
MR. VAN SCIVER:

It's race oriented.

MR. MORGAN: Good point. Like to clarify
that. Seemed to identify based upon her
youth, based on her eye contact with him and
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based on her friendliness toward the
defendant. Not that she identified in the
sense they were from the same culture.
(T. 525).
At the close of the trial court's voir dire of Sanchez
on the death penalty, the prosecutor, apparently recognizing at
that point Sanchez's friendliness towards defendant, engaged in
the following brief colloquy:
MR. MORGAN:
you're 21?

One question.

MS. SANCHEZ:

Mrs. Sanchez,

Yeah.

MR. MORGAN: You think you can take a look at
this case, and evidence, and put aside any
feelings of sympathy vou may have?
MS. SANCHEZ:

Yeah.

MR. MORGAN: The fact the defendant is very
young, is that going to bother you?
MS. SANCHEZ: No.
MR. MORGAN:

Thank you.

(T. 413) (emphasis added).13
A prosecutor is entitled to rely on his "hunches" and
his past experience in making his race-neutral peremptory
strikes.

Hernandez v. State, 808 S.W.2d 536, 543 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991) (finding that the prosecution's race-neutral reason
for striking a female Hispanic juror on the ground that the juror
might be attracted to the defendant or his counsel was not
clearly erroneous).

In this case the prosecutor detected an

apparent favoritism that, by its nature, does not come through
13

The voir dire of Sanchez is attached at Addendum M.
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the dry, printed record.

As the United States Supreme Court has

explained, "In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the
decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.

There

will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best
evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises
the challenge. . . .

[E]valuation of the prosecutor's state of

mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a
trial judge's province."
1869 (1991).

Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859,

As noted above, the trial court did not make

findings following the prosecutor's tender of his reasons and
defendant's brief challenge.

It would appear that the court

found the reasons adequate and that they only confirmed its
earlier ruling, that the prosecutor had not engaged in
"systematic exclusion" of the alleged minority jurors (T. 525).
Defendant is correct, however, that the prosecutor's
evaluation of Sanchez's response to the death-qualifying voir
dire is not supported by the record (Appellant's Brief at 32).
While an unsupported statement on a major issue would appear to
be a illegitimate reason in support of a race-neutral explanation
for the use of a peremptory strike, the prosecutor's approach to
defendant's Batson challenge suggests otherwise.

At the moment

the trial court made its ruling that the prosecution strikes did
not evidence a discriminatory pattern, it was unnecessary for the
prosecution to have proceeded further.
tendered those reasons.

Yet, he willingly

It is unreasonable to believe that a
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capable prosecutor, such as Mr. Morgan, would have intentionally
offered a clearly inaccurate statement, knowing that all
defendant or the trial court would have to have done to disarm
his argument was to recall what Sanchez's testimony actually was.
The most reasonable Explanation for the prosecutor's inaccurate
statement was that it was a mistake.
If this Court were to regard the above-referenced
discrepancy as significant, considering the otherwise cogent
character of the prosecutor's reasons for exercising peremptory
strikes against both Mayeda and Sanchez, the proper remedy would
be to remand the case back to the district court to permit the
prosecutor a fuller opportunity to rebut any inference that his
peremptory strike against Sanchez was discriminatorily made.

See

Span, 819 P.2d at 342-43 (ordering remand even where the
prosecutor asked a stricken Vietnamese juror no questions during
voir dire and articulated only a vague reason not related to the
facts of the case for striking him).

If on remand the trial

court finds the exclusion was not based on discriminatory intent,
then the conviction should be affirmed.

If, instead, the court

finds that the challenge was racially motivated, then a new trial
must be ordered.

Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597.1A

14

In ordering previous remands, this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have instructed the lower courts that if they
determined that no race-neutral explanation existed justifying
the peremptory challenge, the courts were then to determine if
the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Cantu m , 750 P.2d at 597; Harrison, 805 P.2d at 780 (citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S, 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828
(1967)). Only Utah and the Military Justice Court have applied a
harmless error analysis to discriminatory strikes. Id.; United
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In sum, however, such discrepancy fails to satisfy
defendant's ultimate burden of persuasion in demonstrating that
Sanchez was struck on account of being an alleged Hispanic.
Batson does not preclude the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges; it "forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential
jurors solely on account of their race . . . ." id. at 89
(emphasis added).

In this case the prosecutor rarely interrupted

the trial court in its voir dire on the death-qualification
issue.

However, the prosecutor clearly detected something in the

course of Sanchez's seemingly acceptable responses that betrayed
a bias in favor of defendant.

He expressed that concern, long

before defendant made his Batson challenge, in his follow-up
inquiries concerning Sanchez's feelings of sympathy because of
defendant's youth.

Later, in explaining his race-neutral reasons

for striking Sanchez, the prosecutor noted that Sanchez was
constantly looking at defendant and making eye contact, behavior

States v. Cooper, 28 M.J. 810 (ACMR 1989). All other courts have
concluded that the racially discriminatory use of a peremptory
strike may never be harmless. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct.
1093, 1099 (1992) (J. Blackmun, concurring) (harmless-error
analysis is inapplicable to certain categories of constitutional
error such as racial discrimination in jury selection); Gomez v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237, 2247-48 (1989) (government
concedes that no harmless-error analysis is applicable to Batsontype violations); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314
(10th Cir. 1987) (new trial mandated if government fails to
articulate a race-neutral explanation); Andrews v. Barnes, 743
F.Supp. 1496, 1508-09 (D. Utah 1990) ("[e]qual protection claims
in the jury selection process may not be defeated by a contention
of absence of prejudice"); People v. Harris, 537 N.E.2d 977, 980
(111. App. 1989) (new trial is mandated if peremptory challenges
were exercised for a racially discriminatory purpose).
Controlling federal case law dictates that if the trial court
finds a Batson violation, a new trial would be required.
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which, in his opinion, betrayed friendly feelings.

Obviously,

the record on appeal cannot reveal the gestures and demeanor of
prospective jurors.

However, considering that the prosecutor

signalled his concern about Sanchez on a race-neutral issue
before the Batson challenge ever appeared, and considering that
the trial court implicitly accepted the prosecutor's reason by
simply proceeding with the trial without comment, this court
should assume that the trial court found the prosecutor's
reasons, in sum, credible, the ultimate test under Batson.
Furthermore, defendant's implicit argument that both
Mayeda and Sanchez were struck because the prosecutor believed
they would be biased in favor of a Hispanic defendant is
undermined by the fact that the State's principal witnesses,
Salas, Velasquez and Rivas, were also Hispanic.

Against this

backdrop, it would make no sense for the prosecution to try to
strike Hispanic jurors.

The United States Supreme Court has

employed precisely this reasoning in Hernandez.

There the Court

recognized that the fact that many of the prosecution's witnesses
and victims were Latino "tended to undercut any motive to exclude
Latinos from the jury."
1872.

Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct at

The Court also held that this factor "could be taken as

evidence of the prosecutor's sincerity" in giving race-neutral
reasons for striking alleged Hispanics.

Ibid.

This Court should

also rely on this factor as one more reason why the prosecutor's
strikes were not racially based.
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On the basis of all of the

foregoing, this Court should hold that the trial court's implied
acceptance of the prosecutor's reasons was not clearly erroneous,
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
THE TWO HOMICIDES WERE COMMITTED INCIDENT TO
A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE.
"In considering [whether there is sufficient evidence
to support the jury's verdict, the appellate court] review[s] the
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.

[The

appellate court] reverse[s] a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted."

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d

443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990), which, as
defendant was charged, provides:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in
the first degree if the actor intentionally
or knowingly causes the death of another
under any of the following circumstances:
(b) The homicide was committed incident
to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or
criminal episode during which two or more
persons are killed.
At the very least there was sufficient evidence to
prove that defendant was criminally liable for a homicide
incident to the principal homicide for which he was convicted,
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both homicides occuring in the course of a single criminal
episode.
"Criminal episode" is defined in Utah Code Ann.
S 76-1-401 (1990), which provides:
In this part unless the context requires
a different definition, "single criminal
episode" means all conduct which is closely
related in time and is incident to an attempt
or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.
Defendant apparently denies the two homicides were
committed in the course of one criminal episode (Appellant's
Brief at 35). However, he effectively admits the events were
closely related in time, when he states, "The entire fight lasted
only a matter of minutes (Appellant's Brief at 37). Thus, the
immediate issue is whether defendant's acts were directed to
accomplishing a single criminal objective.

In denying such a

result, defendant misapplies relevant authority.
In State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977), the
defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated
kidnapping, as a result of his forcibly relieving a police
officer of his revolver and thereafter using hitchhikers as
hostages to avoid apprehension at a roadblock.

The court

concluded that the defendant was not entitled to avoid
responsibility for the two convictions because the two offenses
occurred at different times and places and the criminal objective
of robbery was "entirely different" than that of kidnapping. Id.,
at 1207.

See also State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah

1977) (refusing to hold, for double jeopardy purposes, that a
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theft to gain unlawful possession of an automobile followed the
next day by an unlawful stop following a high speed chase to
avoid apprehension was a single criminal episode); State v.
Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (burglary and a theft
occurring twenty minutes apart in two separately secured
buildings was a single criminal episode).
In State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987), this
Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for first degree murder
under section 76-5-202(1)(b).

The body of one victim was found

in Lark, the other in the Jordan River near 2100 South, Salt Lake
City.

There were no eyewitnesses to the killings and evidence

only that, during the period the victims were missing, the
defendant's activities could not be accounted for over a period
of about one and one-half hours.

Notwithstanding such

circumstantial evidence, this Court found there was sufficient
evidence that the two victims were killed at the same time and in
the course of one criminal episode. .Id. at 1054.
It is defendant's burden to marshal evidence supporting
the jury's verdict when challenging sufficiency of evidence.
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990).

Both this

Court and the court of appeals have made the marshaling
requirement a prerequisite to reviewing insufficient evidence
claims.

State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475076 (Utah 1990);

State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah App. 1992) (refusing to
consider the defendant's attorney representation claim for
failure to marshal evidence, noting that without evidence to
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support the trial court's ruling, the appellate court is
compelled to search the record for facts on which it can base a
meaningful review).

In this case defendant has entirely failed

to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict.
In contradistinction to the defendants in Ireland and
Cornish, defendant, if not by himself then with his cohorts,
murdered the Newinghams in pursuing the single criminal objective
of ejecting them from the Gabaldon property with unlawful force.
Defendant admitted he first threatened Don Newingham with a
knife, stating that he and Gabaldon did not want him there (T.
1263).

As Don and Salas retreated, defendant followed them to

the car, backed by his friends (T. 878). When Don was attacked
by Gabaldon and a fight ensued, defendant stabbed Don to death
(T. 881-83).

Shayne Newingham immediately jumped out of the car

to help his father and was confronted by Martinez, Manuel
Alvarez, DeHerrera, Negrete and Gabaldon (T. 884-85).
moments he too was stabbed to death (T. 886, 1236).

Within

Velasquez

testified that he witnessed defendant stab Shayne Newingham
(T. 886). Considering that one killing almost immediately
followed the other, all with the purpose of ejecting unwanted
visitors from the premises with unlawful force, this dual
homicide must be regarded as one criminal episode.

On such

eyewitness testimony, this Court can find there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict convicting defendant of
first degree murder.
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That the jury did not convict defendant also of
Shayne's killing, while it may appear inconsistent with its
finding him criminally liable for the incidental homicide
required under section 76-5-202(1)(b), is immaterial to the
question of whether there was sufficient evidence.

In State v.

Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) habeas corpus
granted on other grounds, Stewart v. DeLand, 830 P.2d 306 (1992),
a case presenting a very similar scenario, the Court found that
there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions of two
prisoners even though the codefendants were acquitted in the face
of equally incriminating evidence.

Ici. at 612.

Commenting on

the apparent inconsistency of verdicts, this Court stated:
The acquittal of Coleman and Dominquez
[codefendants] does not necessarily require
appellants' acquittal. "That the verdict may
have been a result of compromise, or of a
mistake on the part of the jury is possible.
But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation
or inquiry into such matters.'• Dunn v. United
States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932).
Ibid.

On rehearing, the Court stated:
In our review, we need make no
quantitative or qualitative comparison of the
evidence as between the different defendants.
We merely consider whether the evidence
against appellant . . . .
. • . Even if we acquiesced in appellant's
argument that the evidence was no greater
against him that against others, it is
generally accepted that the inconsistency of
verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground
to set the verdicts aside. • . . A jury's
acguittal of a defendant . . . may also
result from some . . . lenity on the jury's
part.
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. . . Courts have always resisted inquiring
into the jury's thought processes and
deliberations.
Id, at 628-29 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

In sum,

there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that
defendant was criminally responsible for two homicides under the
first degree murder statute, notwithstanding any presumed
inconsistency in not also finding defendant guilty for the
killing of Shayne Newingham.
Defendant apparently takes for granted that accomplice
liability is a necessary element of the double homicide variation
murder in the first degree, and therefore his acquittal of
Shayne's death removes him from the operation of the section 765-202(1)(b) (Appellant's Brief at 36-37).

Assuming, arguendo,

the necessity of accomplice liability, there was still sufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict, notwithstanding his
acquittal of Shayne's death.
"A participant who encourages or assists others in a
crime may be found guilty when the evidence supports his
conviction."

Stewart, 729 P.2d at 611 (citing Utah Code Ann. §

76-2-202 (1978)).15

Accomplice liability may be found even

though the defendants have not been shown to have actually fired
the gun or delivered the blows or threats on the victims, if they
are shown to have participated in the offenses through their
15

Utah Code Ann. $ 76-2-202 (1990), unamended since its
enactment in 1973, and providing for the liability of parties is
quoted in full in the State's discussion of the sufficiency of
evidence to support the imposition of the "gang enhancement" rsee
Appellee's Brief at 59) and in Addendum A.
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encouragement of unlawful acts. Virgin Islands v. Navarro, 513
F.2d 11 (3rd Cir.), cert, denied, 422 U.S. 1045, 95 S. Ct. 2662
(1975) (holding three codefendants responsible for the assault
and murder of an off-duty policeman and his brother,
respectively, where the codefendants encircled the victims and
shouted, "Kill him," in unison, though victims were shot at and
assaulted by another); State v. Moczyqemba, 379 P.2d 557 (Ore.
1963) (finding four prisoners responsible for assault with a
dangerous weapon, although no single prisoner could be identified
as the knife wielder).
Defendant's actions, before those of any others,
elevated the incident at issue here to hostility.

His knife

wielding, followed by his viciously stabbing Don Newingham, was
ample evidence of his encouragement of his fellows in assaulting
Shayne in a deadly manner.

More importantly, defendant was

witnessed to have also stabbed Shayne, an act which would surely
evidence his aid and encouragement of DeHerrera, who may also
have stabbed Shayne Newingham.

Thus, even if accomplice

liability is necessary under the statute, the evidence is
sufficient to support defendant's conviction.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT
ACTED IN CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE PERSONS
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 (SUPP.
1992), WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
At the conclusion of the guilt phase, defendant waived
the jury for the penalty phase (T. 1414).

The trial court, after

sentencing defendant to life imprisonment, thereafter imposed a
58

twenty-year minimum sentence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1 (Supp. 1992), the "gang enhancement" (T. 1424).

In support

of its imposition of the gang enhancement, the trial court
entered findings of fact demonstrating that defendant had acted
in concert with at least two other persons (T. 1424; R.344-47,
attached at Addendum B).
When challenging a trial court's factual findings, "the
appellant must show that the findings of fact were clearly
erroneous" by marshaling "all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrating] that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings against an attack."
Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475-76; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992) provides:
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense
listed in Subsection (3) in concert with two
or more persons is subject to an enhanced
penalty for the offense as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons"
as used in this section means the defendant
and two or more other persons would be
criminally liable for the offense as parties
under Section 76-2-202.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1990) provides:
Every person, acting with the mental
state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall
be criminally liable as a party for such
conduct.

59

In this case defendant fails to fully marshal the
evidence demonstrating the involvement of others to the extent
they are liable as parties.

The evidence was abundant that Tony

DeHerrera could have been found liable for intentionally causing
the death of Shayne Newingham.

Five witnesses collectively

testified that DeHerrera had offered one of them the use of a
knife during the fight (T. 1032), held bloody knives following
the fight (T. 1129-30), sought to have the knives hidden
following the fight (T. 1143) and admitted to stabbing at least
one of the victims (T. 1055, 1097, 1109, 1114, 1143).

Anthony

Valerio testified that he saw DeHerrera stab Shayne (T. 1236,
1256).

Richard Gabaldon, who pled to two counts of aggravated

assault (T. 602). He admitted to having stomped Don Newingham in
the face, apparently while Salas attempted to cover Don, both he
and Don covered with blood.

Gabaldon admitted that as he stomped

Don his (Gabaldon's) sister, Kim, implored him, "Leave him alone.
You're killing him." (T. 647-56, 886, 929-30, 1178-80).
Defendant mistakenly assumes that accomplice liability,
pursuant to section 76-2-202, requires that those acting with
defendant also be found criminally liable for intentionally
causing one of the deaths.
1983), this Court stated:

In State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah
"A defendant can be criminally

responsible for an act committed by another, but the degree
his

responsibility

of

is determined by his own mental state in the

acts that subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental
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state of the actor*

This is clear from the language of

S 76-2-202 . . . .M Id. at 534 (emphasis in original). Thus,
DeHerrera and Gabaldon could have been found parties under
section 76-2-202 even though, in aiding and abetting the killings
of the Newinghams they did not act with an intent to kill.

Party

liability would attach even if they had some lesser culpable
mental state.
The trial court's written findings stated, in pertinent
part:
2. This offense was committed in concert
with two or more persons, including but not
limited to the criminal participation in the
assaults causing the deaths of Donald and
Shayne Newingham by Richard Gabaldon, Manuel
Martinez, Manuel Alvarez, Tony DeHererra
[sic] and others unknown, each of which would
be criminally liable as parties to the
offense.
(T. 347)
In this case Gabaldon pled to two counts of aggravated
assault.

Manuel Alvarez was referred to juvenile court in

connection with this incident and charged and convicted of
assault (T. 750). DeHerrera was also charged (T. 750). Further,
there was evidence to show that Fernando Negrete could have been
charged with assault for hitting Shayne (T. 1031).
On the basis of the above-referenced facts the trial
court's findings, which comport substantially with the facts,
cannot be said to be clearly erroneous.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State
respectfully requests that this Court affirm, defendant's
conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jy

day of February,

1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

United States Constitution
Amendment XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Code Annotated
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined - Joinder of offenses
and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of
offense or for conduct of another.
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

Utah Code Annotated
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in
Subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons is subject to
an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this
section means the defendant and two or more other persons would
be criminally liable for the offense as parties under Section
76-2-202.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this
section are:

(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life
sentence is imposed, the convicted person shall be sentenced to a
minimum term of 20 years in prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
•

• • .

(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter
5, Part 2[.]
76-5-202. Aggravated murder.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the
actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another
under any of the following circumstances:
.

• . .

(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme,
course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more
persons are killed.

ADDENDUM B

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
B. KENT MORGAN, Bar No. 3945
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS RE: IMPOSITION
OF SENTENCE AND
APPLICABILITY OF §76-203.1
U.C.A.

Plaintiff,

Case No. 901901149FS
FRED A. ALVAREZ,
Honorable Richard H. Moffat
Defendant
Sentencing

proceedings

were

had

on

November

29,

1990

before this Court, wherein defendant had been found guilty by a
jury of

the offense of Criminal

Homicide, Murder

in the First

Degree, the Court having entered and recorded said verdict.
Defendant,

represented

waived any rights to waiting

by

counsel, Robert

Van

Sciver,

any minimum time before proceeding

with the imposition of sentence.

The State of Utah, by and through

its counsel presented facts in aggravation of the sentence, and the
defendant through his counsel presented facts in mitigation of the
sentence.

ftOMA

Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re:
Imposition of Sentence and Applicability
Of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A.
Case No. 901901149FS
Page 2

Having carefully considered the evidence adduced at trial
and

the

sentencing

otherwise

fully

proceedings,

informed

in

arguments

of

matter

the

the

counsel
Court

and

being

enters

the

following:
FINDINGS QF FACT
1." AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
a.

The

defendant

was

the

actual

perpetrator

of

the

offense where he personally inflicted numerous stab wounds to the
back of Donald Newingham without

justification

and committed

said

intentional killing incident to one course of conduct and criminal
episode during which,

in addition to causing

the death of Donald

Newingham, Shane Newingham was killed;
b.

The defendant

has a significant

history of juvenile

adjudications wherein if such offenses were committed by an adult,
said

record would

show a propensity

for violence

and

a disregard

for the rights of others;
c.
of

The defendant has enmeshed himself in an environment

continuing

guidance

and

anti-social
participation

conduct,
in

a

through

street

gang

the
known

inauspicious
as

"Diamond

Street" as reflected in testimony adduced at trial and as depicted
in photographs

of

graffiti

and

other

drawings

introduced

in the

sentencing proceedings;

C0345

Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re:
Imposition of Sentence and Applicability
Of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A.
Case No. 901901149FS
Page 3

2.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
a.

The defendant was at the time of offense and remains

at the time of sentencing,

17 years of age, and therefore was

relatively young at the time of the offense;
b.

The defendant had consumed a great deal of alcohol

immediately

prior

substantially
criminality

to

impaired
of

his

the

commission

of

the

offense

which

the defendant's ability to appreciate the

conduct

or

to

conform

his

conduct

to

the

requirements of the law.
Having

found

these

aggravating

and

mitigating

circumstances to be true, the Court now enters its:
CONCLUSIONS EEgARPlNS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY
The
standard

aggravating

of

"beyond

circumstances
a

reasonable

do

not

doubt"

outweigh
the

by

a

mitigating

circumstances found, and therefore the Court imposes the sentence
of life imprisonment.
Having imposed the sentence of life in prison, the Court
now

enters

its

findings

regarding

the

applicability

of Section

76-3-203.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
1.

The defendant having been found guilty of Criminal

Homicide, Murder in the First Degree has been adjudged guilty of a
capital offense for which a life sentence has been imposed;

Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re:
Imposition of Sentence and Applicability
of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A.
Case No. 901901149FS
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2.
more

persons,

participation
Shane

This offense was committed
including

but

not

limited

in the assaults causing

Newingham

by

Richard

in concert with two or
to

the

criminal

the deaths of Donald and

Gabaldon,

Manuel

Martinez,

Manuel

Alvarez, Tony DeHererra and others unknown, each of which would be
criminally liable as parties to the offense.
3.

The Court finds no circumstances, in the interests of

justice, or otherwise, which would justify suspension of imposition
or the execution of the enhanced sentence.
Therefore,
provided

by

Section

the

Court

finds

that

76-3-203.1, Utah

Code

the

enhanced

Annotated,

penalty
1953, as

amended applies and defendant is ordered to serve a minimum term of
twenty years in prison.
IT

IS

SO ORDERED,

commitment

to

issue

forthwith

and

execution of sentence is to commence from the oral order of the
Court given on the 23rd day of November 1990 in open court.
DATED this

c*

day of December, 1990.
BY THE COURT:
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Imposition

of

was

at 321 South

mailed

600 East,

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this 4th day of December, 1990.
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y ^ A T & O F UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

c

Plaintiff.

vs.

I

FRED A. ALVAREZ

\

(JAIL)

1

l

f

Defendant.

—JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
"(COMMITMENT)

v~~

'

901901149

Case No. .
T
Count No.
Honorable RICHARD H. MOFFAT
Clerk
KATHY GROTEPAS
Reoorter
HAL WALTON
Reporter
LYNN HUFFMAN
Bailiff
Date

NOVEMBER 2 9 , 1990

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by jp a jury; O the court; O plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of C r i m i n a l Hnmiririe, Murder i n t h e F i r s t Degraea felony
of the l s t degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by Rt VanSCJVer, and the State being represented by K- Mnrggp
is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
XX3
D
D
O
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
G

MINIMUM
to a)titMMM
mandatory term of
ZQ
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to
such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
XX$ Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake CountyXXfor delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
XXffl Commitment shall issue FORTHWITH
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

ADDENDUM D

FILED BJSTniCT COURT
Third Judicial District

ROBERT VAN SCIVER (#3319)
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 322-5678

NOV o l 1990
SALTr LAKE COUNTY

By.
A

Deputy Cterk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO PRECLUDE DEATH
QUALIFICATION OF THE
JURY VENIRE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 901901149
(Judge Moffat)

FRED A. ALVAREZ,
Defendant.

The Defendant, by his attorney, moves this Court for an
Order

Precluding

Defendant's Trial.

Death

Qualification

Defendant

asserts

of

the

Jury

that death

Venire

in

qualification

creates juries which are under-representative of the community at
large, are conviction prone, and are more likely to impose the
death penalty.

Thus, the effect is to deny him of the right to a

fair trial, in violation of Article I, Section

12 of the Utah

Constitution and of Article I, Section 7 of tKdvUtah Constitution.
A capital case is the only case where ju/orslare told from the
outset to think about the penalty which shbuld dr could be imposed.
Dated this
i s ^

day of

ROBERT VAN SCIVER
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion to Preclude Death Qualification of the Jury Venire
was hand-delivered to Kent Morgan, Deputy County Attorney, 231 East
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111/ on ] the

1^7

day of

October, 1990.

n n an

ADDENDUM E

INSTRUCTION NO. N
Before you can convict the defendant, Fred A, Alvarez, of
the

crime

charged

of

Criminal

in Count

Homicide, Murder

I of

the

in

Information,

the First

you

must

Degree, as

find

from

the

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements
of that crime:
1.

That on or about the 9th day of June, 1990, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, Fred A. Alvarez, caused

the death of

Don Newingham; and
2.

That

Fred

A.

Alvarez

caused

said

death

either

intentionally or knowingly; and
3-

That

Fred

A.

Alvarez

caused

said

death

under

circumstances where the homicide was committed incident to one act,
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or
more persons were killed.
4.

That Fred A. Alvarez did so unlawfully.

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
State

has

proved

each

and

elements, you must convict
the

evidence

has

failed

every

one

of

the defendant.
to

so

establish

the

above

mentioned

On the other hand, if
one

or

more

of

said

elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree.

ADDENDUM F

JCltu vtsi mCT GWWT
Third Judicial District

NOV 2 9 1990
ANSWER TO JURY INQUIRY
SALT LAKE COUNTY

Your are first directed to Instruction No. 6:

By

\L6L

The elements of the offense are containedAInstruction 11 for Count I and
Instruction 12 for Count II. The definitions for these* Instructions
are contained in Instructions No. 13, 15 and 18. By reviewing these
Instructions you should be able to answer that question.

ADDENDUM G

RUB DISTRICT COUf?T
Third Judicial District

ROBERT VAN SCIVER (#3319)
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 322-5678
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO STRIKE
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 901901149
(Judge Moffat)

FRED A. ALVAREZ,
Defendant.

The defendant, by his attorney, moves the Court to strike
the language entitled "Sentencing Enhancement" from the Information
on file in this case.

The grounds for this motion are:

1. The magistrate made no finding after the preliminary
hearing

that there was probable cause

to believe

§76-3-203.1

applied in this case.
2.

The State failed to prove at the preliminary hearing

as a matter of law that the enhancement applied.
3.

Section 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutionally vague and

consequently denies the defendant due process \f

law as guaranteed

by the state and federal constitutions.

"j$-

Dated this

day of October, A990.

ROBERT-VShTSC IVER
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Motion

to

Strike

Sentencing

Enh^Htf^ipent

was

hand

delivered to B. Kent Morgan, Deputy County A^£^*n^Yr 231 East 400
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on the/ ASr/l
1990.

day of October,

ADDENDUM H

1

MR. VAN SCIVER:

I don't see that.

2

THE COURT:

I don't, either.

3

MR. MORGAN:

4

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Well, no.

I don't think that's

true.

7
3

He has no standing to raise gender

anyway, your Honor.

5
5

No.

MR. MORGAN:

There is no male/female issue that

the Court has ever recognized as being a member of an

9 J insular minority and the fact that he is male does not
10

even entitle him to a fair cross-section of the community

11

itself.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. MORGAN:

14

As between male and female?
Much less which no court has ever

held that he is entitled to a fair cross-section.

15

Move on to whatever else you may think, Bob.

|6 I

MR. VAN SCIVER:

17
Ig
19
20

authority here.

Let me just find a little

You're dead wrong.

THE COURT:

If you're not going to raise it,

what difference does it make?
MR. VAN SCIVER:

It probably does.

But I don't

21

want him to think that the systematic exclusion of women

22

as opposed to men is a Constitutionally constituted exercise

23 I of a pre-emptory.
24
25

I think the biggest problem here is Hispanics.
His first pre-emptory/ he took three Hispanics on the panel.

515

1

He took one of them with his first pre-emptory and the

2

second one with his fifth.

3

MR. MORGAN:

4

THE COURT:

5

I'm entitled to exempt—
You think that shows a pattern of

exclusion of Hispanics?

6

MR. VAN SCIVER:

That is what this case stands

7

for.

Says, "Here, the jury was charged with deciding

g

whether De Gross, a Hispanic woman, illegally aided and

9

abetted the transportation of undocumented Mexican aliens

Q

into the United States, an offense that arguably has racial

I

and ethnic overtones.

The prosecutor exercised a pre-

emptory challenge against the only Hispanic on the jury.
The combination of these relevant circumstances convinces us
that a prima facie case of racial discrimination has been
made."
I think the burden shifts to him.
THE COURT:

Whose case?

MR. VAN SCIVER:
9

I

THE COURT:

What's the case?

Which case?

Batson?

20

MR. MORGAN:

Batson is black.

2| i

MR. VAN SCIVER:

This is De Gross, part of Batson

22 I progeny«
2*

THE COURT:

24

MR. VAN SCIVER:

25

What court?
U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth

Circuit, which is, you know, California.

516

1

MR, MORGAN:

That would fall under Batson, your

2

Honor, because if there was only one Hispanic to choose

3

from and the prosecutor did eliminate that Hispanic, he

4

would have removed all Hispanics from the jury.

5

THE COURT: By the same token, I'm not sure

6

you're entitled to do that as long as it's not done for a

^

race neutral reason.

8

MR. MORGAN:

9

MR. VAN SCIVER:

10
11

Excuse me?
That's exactly right. Now, he

has to demonstrate the race neutral reason.
MR. MORGAN:

We're not there, yet.

Batson stands

12

for the proposition that the prosecutor, if the defense

13

can show that the prosecutor or his office engages in

14

systematic exclusion of a particular race, then the burden

15

shifts to us to show neutral and exempt reasons; however,

16

it said that can never be shown merely because you exclude

17

one or more of that insular minority from the jury. You

18

must exclude them all in order for the defense to make out

19

a prima facie case. And then the burden would shift to me.

20

Now, I would submit to the Court at this point

21

that the State has permitted and wants Robert Galvez, a

22

Hispanic, on that jury, and that puts us into a situation

21

where I believe your Honor has to have some evidence from

24

Counsel showing that I am in a position of systematically

25

excluding minorities from the jury.
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The fact that I choose

1

two does not put me in a position yet without some showing

2

from Counsel that I am engaging in any kind of racial

3

activity at this point.

4
5

And for the record, I certainly deny it and I am
prepared with neutral and detached reasons.

6

MR. VAN SCIVER:

7

MR. MORGAN:

8

THE COURT:

9

defining Hispanic.

Let's hear them.

I want the Court to make a finding.
Bob, I have a problem here in

I had a conversation about this with

tO

Andy Valdez.

11

where former Mexican citizens who come here and settle and

12

I would say obviously yes.

13

yes-

14

Hispanics, for generations and is the site

Is it their progeny?

Probably

What about the grandchildren where the first

15

generation perhaps marries people of other ethnic back-

1$

grounds?

17

go down the road, and I don't think that's just because

18

somebody carries a name that has historically had a Hispanic

19

or Spanish background that that necessarily labels them as

20

being a part of a discrete minority.

21

problem here.

What about great-grandchildren?

How far do we

So, I have a little

22

Are you telling me we have got three or four here

2|

where I don't have any evidence whatsoever that you haven't

24

got a half dozen, or what the hell group we're talking

25

about?

What are these people?

Do they fit within the

518

category?
MR. VAN SCIVER:

The two people I'm referring to

in the exercise of his first pre-emptory challenge which
was Annie Sanchez, who is on the panel, and the second, or
the second objectionable one was Wendy Mayeda, and that's
Juror No. 21. That was the prosecutor1s fifth challenge.
All right.
Now, this is what they talk about. The litigants
might demonstrate that this fact—the party cannot challenge
a venire person on account of their group membership.

And

I think group membership has been established because
they're Hispanics.
THE COURT:

How do you know they're Hispanic?

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Well, they have Hispanic names.

You can't dilute the concept of identification simply
because they're third or fourth generation. That's—
THE COURT: What if Wendy Mayeda is married and
she married a Hispanic?
MR. VAN SCIVER:

Well, that doesn't—she's a

Hispanic and married a Hispanic?
THE COURT: No.

What if she's not Hispanic and

married a Hispanic?
MR. VAN SCIVER:
has a Hispanic name.
THE COURT:

She appears to be Hispanic and

That's all I can do.
I understand that.
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MR. VAN SCIVER:

1

Let me read what it says so we

2

get it in.

The burden then shifts to the offending party

3

to articulate a nondescript minority reason related to the

4

particular case to be tried for challenging the jury.

5

District Court finding regarding purposeful discrimination

€

in jury selection process are findings which we will not

7

set aside unless clearly onerous.

8

aside.

The

Here, they set them

The case I saw appealed, Judge Young required them

9
10

to put something on the record.

11

District Court's inference on account of gender was clearly

12

onerous to challenge and then they go on to say about this

13

one, Hispanic and taking him off.
MR. MORGAN: We're mumbling through the first

14
15

part.

16

two our of three.

17
18

Here, we cannot say the

Where have I systematically excluded?

I have taken

Your Honor, make a finding that that's systematic
exclusion or not.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MORGAN:

I don't think it is.
All right.

Further argument would

21

be two out of three, as I eliminated two female Hispanics

22

and left the male Hispanic.

23

he's male, so that doesn't work.

24
25

But your client is not female,

Further, I testify on the record and swear as an
officer of the Court, that I have neutral and detached

520

reasons that if this Court requires me or would even like
me to make a record further.
THE COURT:

I think in spite of the fact I do not

think this shows a pattern of exclusion of Hispanics,
particularly in view of the fact we had three out of 38 to
start with, or three out of 32.
MR. VAN SCIVER:

So that you know and we are

complete on that, there are four people.

Do you want their

names for the record?
10 I
11

THE COURT:

I don't care.

You can put them in if

you want.

12

MR. VAN SCIVER:

I'll call their numbers then.

13

Jurors 21, 28 and 46 appears to be Hispanics and have

14

Hispanic names.

15

appearance, and I took her off because she was going to

15

sleep.

17
18
19

Juror No. 42 appears to be Hispanic in

MR. MORGAN:

I didn't recognize Mrs. Anderson as

being Hispanic.
THE COURT: Well, I didn't either, but I think in

20

view of you now end up with one Hispanic out of 12, that's

2i

greater than five percent.

22

percentages.

2j

than five percent make-up of the jury and since you and I

24

were discussing it earlier in the process of this jury

25

qualification, we don't have five percent cross-section of

I don't know about the

But I did calculate that, and it's greater

521

the Hispanics are you're defining them for this purpose in
the community.

I think you've got a decent cross-section

of the community in that representation and I frankly don't
think that the taking off of those two, if they are
Hispanic, would constitute a discrete minority pattern here.
But I do think in order to make this complete for the
record, having taken that stand, Mr. Morgan, you ought to
put on the record the reasons for excluding those two
jurors and at least we've got a complete record on it.
MR. MORGAN:

10

Okay.

Mr. Van Sciver, you're not

alleging that I engaged in purposeful discrimination, but

11

other than by eliminating those two, you're not accusing

12

me of being a racist?

13

MR. VAN SCIVER:

14

MR. MORGAN:

15

VJhat if I were?

I would like to hear the evidence on

it.

16
.. I

MR. VAN SCIVER:

I don't understand what you're

-g

thinking.

I am accusing you of consciously and deliberately

19

taking Hispanics off this jury, Mr. Morgan, and in a

20

contrived effort to take minorities in this case out of this

21

case, yes.

I'm accusing you of that.

„ I
MR. MORGAN:
•j two of the jurors?
,
-5

That's based only upon eliminating

MR. VAN SCIVER:
eliminated two-thirds.

There are three Hispanics and you

You consciously did that with your

522

first and fifth pre-emptory.
MR. MORGAN:
anything like that.

Not based on any personality or
You've alleged there are four. You

took one off, I had taken half of them off and you took a
quarter of them off.
MR. VAN SCIVER:

Well, if Joan Anderson, who

appears to be Hispanic—
MR. MORGAN:

We donft know that.

You allege you

thought she was.
10 I
11
12

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Hispanic in appearance and the

reason I took her off, she was going to sleep.
THE COURT:

Okay.

But the point still is, if

13

that's the case, then he's taking off two out of four and

14

you've taken one out of four, right?

15

MR. MORGAN:

16

MR. VAN SCIVER:

17

THE COURT:

1*

MR. VAN SCIVER:

1*
20

Right.
Doesn't make any difference.

I think it does.
Certainly have given you a race

neutral reason for taking my person off the jury.
THE COURT: Well, I don't deny it, but the point

*1

of it is, you don't take yours off and reduce the then

22

number available to three and accuse him of taking two-

21

thirds of them off.

He took half of the Hispanics that

24

were available off.

He didn't take two-thirds of them.

25

That's what I •in saying to you.
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1

MR. VAN SCIVER:

2

MR. MORGAN:

Okay.

I would like to proceed in case the

3

Court's finding that there is no systematic exclusion to

4

set aside.

5

follows:

6

for the following reasons:

7

she would be suffering a financial hardship and she also

8

indicated she has personal problems and would have difficult;

9

in concentrating, and that she's going through a separation,

The prosecutor's neutral non-race reasons are as

Wendy Mayeda, the State took off, Juror No. 21,
She's youthful, she indicated

10

even though she is not married at the time.

She also

11

indicated that although she would follow the Court's

12

instructions with regard to the death penalty, that she had

13

some scruples over the death penalty. For those reasons,

14

the State elected its pre-emptory challenge and removed

15

Wendy Mayeda from the panel.

16

With respect to Annie Sanchez, Juror No. 46, the

17

State pre-empted her for the following neutral, non-racial

18

reasons.

19

to identify with the defendant during the course of the

20

jury voir dire.

21

also indicated that she had scruples against the death

22

penalty, even though she would follow, she had to be talked

23

to quite a bit in comparison to the rest of the jurors,

24

about her ability to pass on the death penalty; therefore,

25

for those reasons, the State pre-empted Annie Sanchez,

She is youthful, she's 21 years old.

She seemed

She was constantly looking at him.
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She

1

Juror No. 46, using its first pre-emptory challenge.

2

MR. VAN SCIVER: May I respond to that?

3

THE COURT: Well, you may.

4

MS. BYRNE: What is there to respond to?

5

gave his reasons.

6

THE COURT: Gave you the reasons.

1

MR. VAN SCIVER:

8

respond to 21.

9
10

He just

Well, and I'm not going to

I'm only going to respond to 46.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. VAN SCIVER: All right.

Seemed to identify

11

with the defendant is the very basis why his pre-emptory

12

and it's his first one.

13

MR. MORGAN:

Good point.

14

MR. VAN SCIVER:

15

MR. MORGAN:

It's race oriented.

Good point.

Like to clarify that.

16

Seemed to identify based upon her youth# based on her eye

17

contact with him and based on her friendliness toward the

18

defendant.

19

from the same culture.

Not that she identified in the sense they were

20

MR. VAN SCIVER:

All right.

21

THE COURT: All right. Go back.

22

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m.f the Court reassembled.)

23

THE COURT: The clerk will read the names of the

M

jurors and the two alternates chosen to serve in this case.

25

As your name is readf please stand and remain standing until
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ADDENDUM I

I

very good job and entailed a lot of sitting.

2

say, my doctor

says—

THE COURT:

3

And like I

I don't want to impose the possibility

4

of inflicting any physical harm on this possible juror,

5

Mr. Van Sciver.
MR. VAN SCIVER:

6

THE COURT:

7

THE COURT:

9

Y e s , your Honor.

I agree.

I think under the circumstances, we

won't impose on you in this case and I'll excuse you at

10

this time.

11
12
-3 I
-

All right with you?

MR. MORGAN:

8

I have no objections, your Honor.

,

15
16
17

MR. WIGGINS:
THE COURT:

I appreciate your coming.

MR. WIGGINS:
THE COURT:

I won't have to come back Friday?

No.

MR. VAN SCIVER:
MR. WIGGINS:

Thank you.

Thank you.

I appreciate it.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken at this time.)

18
19

All rignt, sir.

THE COURT:

I believe the bailiff indicated to me

20 I yesterday that you had some concerns that you wanted to
21 J voice privately.
MS. MAYEDA:

22
23

right now.

Yeah.

I'm going through a separatiorj

We're not married, we just lived together.

And

24

I'm just having a really hard time with trying to deal with

25 J

all that; and then trying to deal with this and concentrate

236

I

on this, too.

2

attention and let you know.

3 I

And I just wanted to bring that to your

THE COURT:

Well, of course, this is a very, very

4 J important matter, as you can well understand.
MS. MAYEDA:
6

I

THE COURT:

Yes.
It's a problem that somebody, either

7

you or somebody like you, is going to have to spend some

g

time on this jury, and both the State and Mr. Alvarez are

9

entitled to have somebody pay attention to the evidence in

10

this case and to do the best job they can.

11

life, unfortunately, have to go through personal crises as

12

well as do other things that are required of them during

13

the course of their life, and believe me when I tell you tha

14

I know that it's difficult to do these things.

15

you have to do it, because I've just recently gone through

16

the same kind of situation, where, in my personal life,

17

there was a tremendous crisis and I still had to come down

18
19
20
21

here and continue to function.

All of us in

I know that

I don't mean to belittle

your problems, but we do need your services and that you
would need to be able to apply your attention and your
best efforts to help us solve this case.
MS. MAYEDA:

22

THE COURT:

23

Yes.

I would try.

Sure you would.

In this case,

24 I Mr. Alvarez is charged with two counts of first-degree
25

murder.

If the jury found him not guilty of either of those
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.

counts, or if you found him guilty only of a lesser charge,
then the jury's function would be concluded and it would

• I be up to the Court to sentence, if the sentence is appro- , priate
On the other hand, if the jury found him guilty of

5
6

either of those two first-degree homicides, then the jury

7

would have evidence submitted to it of aggravating and

8
9
10

mitigating circumstances. And do you understand what I am
saying when I talk about aggravating and mitigating circumstances?
^S. MAYEDA:

11

THE COURT:

12
13
!4

15
16
.-

You mean intentional o r —
Well, things of that sort; in other

words, things that would make the commission of the murder
I more heinous, more wrongful, more egregious?
understand?

Do you

And the mitigating circumstances would be

things which make it less that way.

And only if the State

could prove beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury would
have to find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that the

18
19

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-

20

stances; and that the death penalty was the only appropriate

21

penalty.

22

they do not bring in the death penalty.

23

impose life imprisonment instead.

24
25

The jury has to find both of those provisions or
You would have to

How do you feel about the death penalty in this
case?

Do you have any ideas or ever thought about it, or
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1
2

how you feel about it?
I just feel I don f t have any right

MS. MAYEDA:

3

to really judge or to really say if this person should be

4

allowed to die or to live.

5

big decision f o r — I mean—even though the evidence—I

6

don't really feel that anybody really deserves to die.

7

That's a lot, and that's really hard for me t o —

8

THE COURT:

•

MS. MAYEDA:

10

I mean that's—that's a pretty

Let me ask it this way.
—to

THE COURT:

say—

I understand it's a momentous and a

11

terrific burden.

But let me put it to you this way:

12

would instruct you after you have heard the aggravating and

13

mitigating evidence, I would instruct you that the jury

14

must unanimously find, and that means every juror would

15

have to agree to the verdict, that the State has proved

16

beyond a reasonable doubt and that's the standard that I

17

read to you yesterday.

18

MS. MAYEDA:

19

THE COURT:

I

Uh huh (affirmative).
First, that the aggravating circun-

20

stances outweighed the mitigating circumstances; and second,

21

that death is the only appropriate penalty.

22

Now, if you found in your own mind that the State

23

proved that beyond a reasonable doubt, would you be able to

24

vote for the death penalty?

25

MS. MAYEDA:

I don't know.
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That's pretty h a r d —

1

p r e 1 1 y h a r d d e c i s i on .

2

T H E COI JRT : Wi : ] 1 , i I *
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3
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t hat y o u were coi w i n c e d beyond a

4

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t that the a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s

5

w e i g h e d 11 ie m i t i g a t i i ig c ircurns tai ices a n d 11 Iat 11 i y >i! « * > > > " <

6

b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y w a s ti.e •. ..

7

appropriate pena] ty; could you then vote for the death

8

p en a ] ty

out .-

:i f > ::::: "i :i i ; • s i: e s c ::: :::) i: :t \ :i i: i c e d i '

9

M S , MA.YEDA:

I don't know even i f I was convinced

Io

I c ou .1 d s t i 1 ] - - y ou know • I j i i s t — even I f 1 wa. s c on vi n c ed ,

II i

i t ' s st :i ] ] hai: d for me to say yes , this is wl: lat- - t h i s :i s : ::•

12

alternative for this p e r s o n , I m e a n .

13

'

• T H E COt J R T :

I .1 .• : " ; i II: '

I

::il. I :: I : I I I • :oi il :i ] ,

"1 |

do 3 t i f y o u w e r e so coi: iv i n c e d , ai id k e e p j :t: :i. m i i id, I • m s a y i n g

15

that y o u " r e convi n e e d to start wi t h .

16

MS

"Il J '

1 1AYEDA:

THE C O U R T :

Gc »sl l!

"1 1 :i :i s ::i s si i :::: I ::t. <::::::: I: ic ::i :: ::::! ::|uesl:

Well , 1 et me ask you another

"IS

questi on.

""III9

pro"v e d b e y o n d a. reason,a.b 1 e doubt , e i t h e r t h a t t h e a g g r a v a t -

20

ing circumstances outweigh the m i t i g a t i n g , or that: the
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deal: Ji penal t] ? was the on] y appropriate penal ty , or they

22

hadi I ' t p r o v e d ei tihei: c f those t w o p r o p o s i t i o n s , .> „*. ^ ^^v.

23

then, b e a b l e t o v o t e for life i m p r i s o n m e n t

;I
25

If you w e r e convinced that the State had not

as o p p o s e d

t:l ICE :3.€ .at .1 i penal t] < ?
M S . MAYEDA:

Probably m o r e so than the death

24 0

»

1

penalty.

Yeah.

That's just—

THE COURT: Well, the standard is higher to be

2
3

required or to allow you to vote for the death penalty.

4

The standard is higher because you've got to be convinced

5

beyond a reasonable doubt of both of those propositions.

6

But in order to impose instead of the death penalty, the

7

life imprisonment, you don't have to be convinced.

8

can be convinced that either one, or both, or neither has

9

been proven, so you see, it's obviously to get to the life

10
11
12
13
14
15

You

penalty and I'm not sure we've satisfactorily answered the
question.
Do you think that you could impose the death
penalty if you were convinced that the State had met its
burden of proof in those two regards?
MS. MAYEDA:

I don't think so.

I mean, I can see

16

whatever the evidence is and, you know, whatever they find

17

him guilty of or anything, I can see for him, you know,

18

painful paying for what he did, and for me to judge for him

19

to have the death penalty, I don't think I could do that,

20

to be honest with you.

21
22
23
24
25

That's pretty hard.

MR. MORGAN: May I?

You recall the question, the

Judge said would you follow the law as he instructed you?
MS. MAYEDA:

Yeah.

I understand the Judge.

MR. MORGAN:

Well, we'll be telling you that that'sj

the law and that if you're convinced beyond a reasonable
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1:1 v e o i
1ike

t:

I have-

t l l a t ' s • • :ii f

1

1

was picked for the jury with the evidence and everything.

2

It's just the d e a t h penalty just seems so much for me.

3
4

THE COURT:

M S . MAYEDA:

Uh—yeah.

I am religious, but I'm

not anything really to have to do with that.

7
3

Do you have strong

religious beliefs?

5
5

I understand.

THE COURT:

Nothing in religion that would prevent

you from imposing the death penalty?

9 I

M S . MAYEDA:

IQ

THE COURT:

No.
Are you telling me then that you would

11

be able to follow the instructions that the Court gave in

12

regard to the imposition of the death penalty if you were

13

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence, that

14

that is what you should do?

15
lg

M S . MAYEDA:
law.

Yes, because I have to follow the

Doesn't leave me much choice.

17

THE COURT:

Ig

M S . MAYEDA:

19

THE COURT:

That's right.
Doesn't leave me any choice.
And once you've become convinced and

20

that you have been satisfied with the evidence, that's your

2|

choice and that the Court wouldn't ever instruct you about

22

that, or that you should or should not believe any evidence

23

or how you would weigh it.

24

M S . MAYEDA:

25

THE COURT:

Yeah.

That's your function as a juror.
I understand

All right.
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1 I

M S . MAYEDA:

2 I

THE COURT:

Yes.

I do

If you were on this jury and the jury

3

were to go into the penalty phase and the jury either did or

4

did not impose a death penalty and it came down either way,

i»

would you be concerned about any criticism that people

g

might make about the jury's decision?
M S . MAYEDA:
THE COURT:

9
10
11
12
13
14

question.

No.
I don't think we need to ask the last

Have you heard or seen anything about this case

prior to this time, other than yesterday?
M S . MAYEDA:

No.

I hadn't heard anything.

I had

heard something on the radio this morning and that was it.
I hadn't heard anything else.
THE COURT:

Anything you have heard, could you

15

put aside and try this case onlv on the evidence that is

lg

brought into Court and admitted by the Court?

17

M S . MAYEDA:

Ig I

THE COURT:

Yes.
If the evidence suggested or showed

19 | that the defendant was a member of a gang, would that fact
20 I alone, cause you to be biased against him?
21
22
23

MS. MAYEDA:
THE COURT:

No.

Any Questions?

MR. VAN SCIVER:

•4

MR. MORGAN:

25

THE COURT:

No.

I'm satisfied, your Honor,

I am as well, your Honor.
Very well.
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Thank you very much.
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no

v t h•

1
2

THE COURT:

Do you have any feelings at this

point about the death penalty as such?

3

MS. CARR:

4

THE COURT:

They are mixed.
Sure they are.

If you were convinced

5

beyond a reasonable doubt, and do you understand what I am

6

saying about—

7

MS. CARR:

8

ing and mitigating.

9

THE COURT:

I am a little confused about aggravat-

All right.

If the defendant were

10

found guilty of the crime of first-degree homicide, the

11

State would then put on evidence which would show that the

12

circumstances are more activated, heinous, more egregious—

13
14

MS. CARR:

Something that's kind of more

potentiated, that t y p e —

15

THE COURT:

Right.

Of course, the defense would

16

put on evidence to try and show that the matter was not as

17

egregious, as serious, as heinous as the State would like

18

you to believe, so that the evidence would go in.

19

have to weigh whether the aggravating circumstances of the

20

murder outweigh the mitigating circumstances.

21

have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that they did.

22

then you have to find secondly, that death is the only

23

appropriate penalty before you could impose the death

24

penalty.

25

Do you understand that?
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c

1

THE COURT:

Sure.

Would you vote for the death

2

penalty in order to insure that no release from prison ever

j

occurred instead of voting for life imprisonment?

4

MS. CARR: No.

5

THE COURT; You would not?

5

Do you see any conflict between sitting on a

Ckay.

7

Ju*Y that may impose the death penalty and the teaching of

g

any religion to which you happen to subscribe?

9

MS. CARR:
THE COURT:

10
11
12

Do you see any conflict between your

sitting on a jury which may impose the death penalty and
the teachings of any religion that you might—

13

MS. CARR:

H

THE COURT:

15

Put that by me again.

Not that I know of.
--that you might subscribe to?

All

right.

1^

Do you believe that a person with or without

17

proper professional help, can change and become a different

18

person and change the course of their life over a period

19

of time?

20
2|

MS. CARR:

I think most people can with professionajl

help.
THE COURT:

If you were to sit on this jury and

23 I it returned a verdict in this case either imposing or not
24

imposing the death penalty; would you be concerned about any

25

criticism that might be levied against you because of that
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1

very v e r d i c t ,
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2

MS.

3

THE COURT:

4
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CARR:

Would t h a , *,
I wouldn't

„ e r you?

_ •_ _ _.

:'

.

L

but it would

5
6
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7
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* *
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11
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12
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13
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Do you feel that it's voui
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duty as a citizen to do this?
MS. CARR:

Well, if I am selected, I'll do it,

given any choice in the matter, I would rather not.
THE COURT:

You don't have any choice and you

would rather go on vacation.

I understand.

Have you had any exposure to any of the facts of
this case prior to yesterday?
MS. CARR:

Nothing.

My T.V. is broken and I

don't take a paper.
Q I

THE COURT:

If the evidence suggested or showed

I J that the defendant is a member of a gang, would that fact
alone prejudice you against him?
MS. CARR:

Uh—probably not, although my parents

do live in an area that is, they live here and there is a
house in Chicago, here and here and behind.

I mean, and

they're surrounded. Everybody belongs to a different gang.
I've had my car tires stabbed when I was down there
visiting and my parents have had a lot of vandalism and
9 I stuff.
20

I really don't think it would prejudice me.

can't honestly say for sure—absolutely wouldn't.

2|

THE COURT:

22 I

MR. VAN SCIVER:
MR. MORGAN:

24 I
25

I

THE COURT:
Thank you.

Anything further?
I have nothing.

No.
No further questions?

You may be excused.

Very well.

Will you please return
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before you at the time of trial?
MR. COOK:

Yes,

THE COURT:

I think so.

If the evidence were that Mr, Alvarez

was a member of a gang, would that fact alone cause you to
be biased or prejudiced against him?
MR. COOK:
recently.

A little bit maybe, just from what I re£d

Try not to influence me.
MR. MORGAN:

Nothing further from the State.

MR. VAN SCIVER:
10 I

Nothing, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

Thank you.

Would you come]

11 I back at 2:00 o'clock on Friday?
12

MR. COOK: Sure.

13 I

THE COURT:

14 I

Mr. Galvez?

15

MR. GALVEZ: Yes.

16

THE COURT:

Rovert Galvez, Juror No. 28.

Mr. Galvez, in this case, the

17

defendant, Mr. Alvarez, is charged with two counts of

18

first-degree murder and if the jury found him not guilty

19

of those charges, or if they came in with a verdict of

20

guilty of a lesser charge, the jury would have finished

21

its duty and the case could be discharged and the imposition|

22

of any penalty that might be required by the law would fall

23

upon me.

24
25

On the other hand, if the jury found him guilty
of either of the two first-degree homicide charges, then the!
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1

jury would reconvene—this same jury, and evidence would be

2

put on to show aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

3

Now, do you understand what I'm saying when I

4

say aggravating and mitigating circumstances?

Do you wish

5 I me to explain that?
g

MR. GALVEZ: Explain it to me.

7

THE COURT: All right. Aggravating circumstances

g

would be things about the murder, how it occurred that would

9

make you more desirous of inflicting the death penalty and

10

mitigating circumstances would be things about the way it

11

occurred and the circumstances under which it occurred

12 I which would cause you to be less desirous of imposing the
13 I death penalty.
14

I that?

15

I

Is that satisfactory?

Do you understand

MR. GALVEZ: Uh huh (affirmative).

jg

THE COURT:

Okay.

And then I would instruct

17

Y o u after you'd heard the evidence from both the State and

lg

from the defendant as to the aggravating and mitigating

19

circumstances.

20
2|

could be imposed only if the jury unanimously, all the

I would instruct you that the death penalty

jurors, found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, first, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed

23

the mitigating circumstances; and second, that the death

24

penalty was the only appropriate penalty.

25

that?
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Do you understand

1

MR. GALVEZ: Uh huh (affirmative).

2

THE COURT: Now, let me ask you a couple of

3

questions.

Have you formed any feelings about the death

penalty?
- I
6

MR. GALVEZ: Yeah.
that.

THE COURT: What are your views on the death

7

g
9

I have some feelings about

penalty?
MR. GALVEZ:

I don't think they should have it

10

except for mass murders, torture slayings or such things.

11

Murder, I really don't think that's appropriate.

12

THE COURT:

If this trial entered the penalty

13 phase, as I've just described it, and I gave you an
1^ I instruction that the jury can only impose the death sentence
jc

after a unanimous finding that the State had proved beyond

lg

a reasonable doubt, first, that the aggravating circumstance^

17

outweigh the mitigating; and second, that death is the only

18

appropriate penalty; and you were convinced beyond a

19

reasonable doubt that the State had proven both of those

20

propositions; that is, you personally were convinced of thos

2|

two propositions.

22
2j

Could you vote for the death penalty?

MR. GALVEZ:

I would really have to—I don't know

the circumstances.

24

THE COURT:

I understand that.

25

MR. GALVEZ: Not sure—I'm not really sure what
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1
2

you're saying.
THE COURT:

What I am saying is, if you were

3

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating

4

circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances--

5

MR. GALVEZ:

6

THE COURT:

Yes.

I know what you mean.

— a n d also convinced that death was

7

the only appropriate penalty, would you be willing to vote

8

for the death penalty?

9
10
11
12
13
14

MR. GALVEZ:

If I was convinced death was the

only appropriate, yes.
MR

* MORGAN:

MR. GALVEZ:

I would.
Sorry, Mr, Galvez.
If I was convinced that the only

appropriate penalty, probably then yes, I would.
THE COURT:

On the other side of the coin, if you

15

felt that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable

16

doubt either one or both of those two propositions, would

17

you be willing to vote for life imprisonment instead of the

18

death penalty?

19

once the defendant has been found guilty, is either life

20

imprisonment or the death penalty.

The two possible penalties, by the way,

21

MR. GALVEZ:

22

THE COURT:

Yes.
Okay.

I would.
Now, during the penalty phase

23

of this trial, as this evidence comes in, would you be

24

able to consider the evidence mitigating in favor of the

25

defendant, and if you found that you thought it was justified
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1

would you be able to consider voting for a sentence less

2

than death, that is, the imposition of a life imprisonment

3

sentence?

4 I

MR. GALVEZ:

5

THE COURT:

Yes.

I would.

All right.

Do you see any conflict

6

between your sitting on a jury that may impose a death

7

penalty and the teachings of any religion that you may

g

subscribe to?

9 I
JO

MR. GALVEZ:

No.

THE COURT:

Do you believe that a person can

If

change with or without professional help and become a

12

better person, and change his approach and his thinking

13

over a period of time?

14 I

MR. GALVEZ:

15

THE COURT:

Yeah.

I do.

If you were on this jury and the jury

16

either imposed or did not impose a death penalty; in

17

other words, if it came down that the defendant was found

18

guilty and the jury imposed either a life imprisonment or

19

the death penalty; would you be concerned that you may be

20

criticized for making that decision?

21

MR. GALVEZ:

22

THE COURT:

No.

To be honest with you.

What are your feelings about serving

23

on a jury where the function is to try this first-degree

24

murder and if the defendant is found guilty of that, you

25

then will be asked to consider the imposition of a death
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1

sentence?

2
3

MR. GALVEZ:
but probably could.

4
5

I sure don't like or don't want to,

THE COURT:

Do you regard it as a big

responsibility?

6

MR. GALVEZ: Certainly.

7

THE COURT:

Do you feel that it's a duty that you

0

have as a citizen to serve on this jury—on a jury like

9

this?

10

MR. GALVEZ: Yeah.

I do.

11

THE COURT: Are you willing to do that?

12

MR. GALVEZ: Yeah.

13

THE COURT: And you're aware of the fact that it's

14

a very serious imposition, and your undertaking it and I

15

am sure in all gravity?

16

MR. GALVEZ: Very much so.

17

THE COURT:

Have you had any exposure to pre-

18

trial publicity before yesterday, with newspapers or

19

television, or radio, or any other way?

20
21
22

MR. GALVEZ: No.

I'm not sure I know what was

done.
THE COURT: You don't recall anything about it?

23

All right.

If the evidence suggested or showed that the

24

defendant is a member of a gang, would that fact alone cause

25

you to be biased or prejudiced against the defendant?
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1

MR. GALVEZ:

2

THE COURT:

•

MR. MORGAN:

Probably not.
Anything further?
Yes, your Honor.

Could you ask the

4

prospective juror whether or not when these categories, I

5

think the death penalty might be appropriate, that it might

g

be multiple murder or two or more persons were killed.
THE COURT:

7

Do you believe that if you were

8

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was

9

involved in multiple murders and the other standards were

10
11

m e t , would you be able to vote for a conviction and also
for a death penalty in those cases?
MR. GALVEZ:

12
13

If I was convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt, yes.

14

MR. MORGAN:

Thank vou.

l5 I

THE COURT:

jg | excused.

Please return at 2:00 on Friday and remember

Thank you very much.

You may be

17 I my admonition
13

MR. GALVEZ:

j9

THE COURT:

20

Mr. Wilson, how are you?

2i

MR. WILSON:
THE COURT:

Okay.
Thank you.

Just great.
Mr. Wilson, in this case, the

23 I defendant, Mr. Alvarez, is charged with two counts of
24

first-degree murder.

If the jury were to return a verdict

25

of not guilty of either of those counts or a verdict that
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1

MS* FALER:

Yes.

2

MR. MORGAN:

Of course.

Could you ask Mrs. Faler whether or

2 I not she would convict someone who was innocent merely
4

because they were a member of a gang?

5
6

THE COURT: You heard that question.
I

MS. FALER:

7

No.

Would you?

I don't think I would do that.

THE COURT: Would you be able, particularly if

8

you were so instructed by the Court, to set aside any

9

feelings that you might have about gangs in general, and

10

apply the law as the Court gives it to you; and specifically

11

as related to the facts of this case?

12

MS. FALER:

Well, I would try.

13
14 I

THE COURT:

I'm sure you would.

15 i

MR. MORGAN: No questions.

16 I

THE COURT: Very well.

17

MR. VAN SCIVER:

MS. FALER: Yes.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. VAN SCIVER:

22
23

Would you please return at

2:00 on Friday?

1g

2|

I'm satisfied.

a robbery.

Thank you
This next person was a victim of

Might want to ask about that.

THE COURT:
about it yesterday.

Darla Chedester?

I think we did ask

Want me to do it again?

24 I

MR. VAN SCIVER:

See—

25 I

THE COURT: Have a seat.
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I believe you indicated

1

yesterday, Mrs. Chedester, that you were a victim of a home

2

burglary, was that it, or a robbery?

3

MS. CHEDESTER:

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. CHEDESTER:

A robbery.

Personal robbery from your person?
Yes.

I was a teller, I said, in

g I 1973, but I thought about it after I was driving home, and
7

it was 1974.

8
9

And I worked for First Security Bank.

THE COURT:

Well, we won't call you a liar for

one year.

10

MS. CHEDESTER:

11

THE COURT:

I was held up at gunpoint.

Oh, gunpoint.

And I asked you

12

yesterday, but let me ask you again so we can clarify this.

13

Would your experience in that regard cause you in any way to

14

be unable to fairly and adequately, and without bias for or

15

against either of the parties in this case, judge the facts

15

in this matter?

17

MS. CHEDESTER:

18

THE COURT:

No, sir.

Okay.

It wouldn f t.

In this case, Mr. Alvarez is

19

charged with two counts of first-degree murder; and if the

20

J u r Y found him not guilty of either of those counts or if

2i

they found that he was guilty of a lesser charge, then the

22

jury's function would be completed in this case and the

23

matter of sentencing would be left to the Court.

24
25

On the other hand, if the jury found him guilty of
either of the first-decree murder charges, then the jury
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1

would have to make a determination as to whether he should

2

then be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.

3

that purpose, there would be a further hearing before the

4

same jury; and there would be evidence introduced before

5

you as to aggravating circumstances surrounding the crime or

6

mitigating circumstances surrounding the crime,

7
8
9

For

And you understand what I'm telling you about
aggravating and mitigating circumstances?
MS. CHEDESTER:

I believe so.

10

THE COURT: Well, let me explain a little more.

11

MS. CHEDESTER:

12

THE COURT: Aggravating circumstances would be

Okay.

13

those things which would make you believe more strongly

14

that the death sentence should be imposed and mitigating

15

circumstances would be the showing of facts and circum-

16

stances which would make you believe that the death penalty

17

should not be imposed.

18

Do you understand that?

19

MS. CHEDESTER:

20

THE COURT: All right. You would receive an

Yeah.

I do.

21

instruction from the Court that would say that you could not

22

impose the death penalty if the jury did not vote for the

23

death penalty unless the jury unanimously, all the members

24

of the jury, found that the State had proved beyond a

25

reasonable doubt, that both of these propositions, one, the
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1

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-

2

stances, and, two, that the death penalty was the only

3

appropriate penalty.

4

Do you understand that?

5

MS. CHEDESTER: Yeah.

6

THE COURT:

Let me ask you some questions.

Have

7

you formed any feelings about the death penalty—have any

8

opinion?

9
10

MS. CHEDESTER:

Itfs really

hard to answer, but I have to be honest.

11
12

Hard one to answer.

THE COURT:

Let me ask you this question.

Well,

go ahead.

13

MS. CHEDESTER:

Uh--I don't think it's right to

14

take someone's life, but I don't know that it's wrong for

15

capital punishment either.

16

Is that what you mean?

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question.

If,

17

after the evidence was put in and during the penalty phase,

18

you personally were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt,

19

that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating

20

circumstances and that death was the only appropriate

21

penalty, would you be willing to vote for the death penalty?

22
23
24
25

MS. CHEDESTER:

Yeah.

I would if it's the only

way.
THE COURT:

If, after that evidence had come in,

you felt that the State had not proved either of those two
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1

propositions or neither of them beyond a reasonable doubt,

2

would you be willing to vote for life imprisonment as

3

opposed to the death penalty?

4

MS. CHEDESTER:

5

THE COURT:

Yeah.

I would.

Would you be able to, at the time the

5

evidence came in, to look at the evidence in mitigation,

7

that would be in favor of the defendant, and to apply that

8

evidence; and if you felt that it was proper, vote for the

9

lesser penalty, that is to vote for life imprisonment as

10

opposed to the death penalty?

11

MS. CHEDESTER:

12

THE COURT:

Yes.

I would.

All right.

Do you believe that life

13 J in prison is a severe penalty?
14
15

MS. CHEDESTER:

U h — I believe that when you have

your freedom taken from you, it does.

15

THE COURT:

You understand that a person who is

17

convicted of first-degree murder in Utah, if they are

13

sentenced to life imprisonment, can be released by the

19

parole board at a later date, under circumstances to be

20

determined by the parole board, and it doesn't mean they

2i

necessarily will be, but it's a possibility at some future

22

date.

You understand?

2j

MS. CHEDESTER:

24

THE COURT:

25

Yeah.

I do understand that.

If you decided that you were going to

vote for life imprisonment and not the death penalty, would
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1

you nevertheless vote for the death penalty simply to

2

prevent the defendant from ever being paroled?

3
4

MS. CHEDESTER:

No.

I don't believe I would do

that.

5

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you see any conflict

6

between your sitting on a jury which may impose the death

7

penalty and the teachings of any religion to which you

8

subscribe?

9
10

MS. CHEDESTER:
time?

11

Uh—could you word that one more

Sorry.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Are there any teachings of a

12

religion that you believe in, which are in conflict with

13

your sitting on a jury that may impose the death penalty?

14

MS. CHEDESTER:

Uh—no.

As I did say, you know,

15

I am not sure if I believe in capital punishment, but

16

probably one of the few that don't.

17

meant?

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. CHEDESTER:

20
21

Is that what you

Well—
As far as religion, I mean my

religion would probably be within myself of my own beliefs.
THE COURT:

Do you believe a person can change

22

with or without professional help perhaps and become better

23

over time and change their attitudes, and affect their

24

life in a better way?

25

MS. CHEDESTER:

Uh—when there was—yes.
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1

believe that, if they want to.

2

THE COURT:

Do you have any concerns that if you

3

were sitting on this jury and whether it imposed the death

4

sentence or the life sentence, that you might be criticized

5

for whichever sentence was handed down?

6

would bother you?

Do you know if that

7

MS. CHEDESTER:

8

THE COURT: What are your feelings about being

9

Urn—I don't believe so, no.

asked to serve on a jury where the guilt or innocence of the

10

defendant is going to have to be determined as to a first-

11

degree homicide?

12

going to be requested to consider imposition of a death

13

penalty.

And if he was found guilty, then you're

14

MS. CHEDESTER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. CHEDESTER:

17

What are my feelings?

Uh huh (affirmative).
It's a hard one to answer, your

Honor.

18

THE COURT: You feel it's a big burden?

19

MS. CHEDESTER:

20

THE COURT: You feel it's a heavy burden?

21

MS. CHEDESTER:

Pardon?

Uh—I don't know.

22

you know—been faced with that.

23

I would be now, if I was called.

24
25

I have never—

I mean, I understand that

THE COURT: You recognize that it's a heavy
responsibility?
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1

MS. CHEDESTER:

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. CHEDESTER:

4

One that you have to face seriously?

THE COURT:

You would have to give a

attention?
MS. CHEDESTER:

•

THE COURT:

•

MS. CHEDESTER:

11

Yes.

You would have to give it your best

7

10

It is.

lot of thought to a n d —

5
fi

Yes.

THE COURT:

Yes.

Your best judgment?
Yes.

Do you feel it's a duty that you owe

as a citizen?

12

MS. CHEDESTER:

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. CHEDESTER:

15

THE COURT:

Yes.

Are you willing to serve?
Yes.

Have you had any exposure to pre-trial

16

publicity about this case?

17

before now?

18

MS. CHEDESTER:

19

THE COURT:

Did you know anything about it

No.

No, I haven't.

If the evidence suggested or showed

20

that the defendant were a member of a gang, would that fact

21

alone cause you to be biased against or prejudiced against

22

the defendant?

23

MS. CHEDESTER:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. VAN SCIVER:

No.

Mr. Van Sciver?
I "m satisfied.
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1
2

MR. MORGAN:

Just one question.

directly?

3

THE COURT: Sure.

4 I

MR. MORGAN:

5
6

May I ask it

sa

Y You

are

If I understand you correctly, you

generally against capital punishment.
MS. CHEDESTER:

Uh—I don't know that I am against

7

it, but what I believe is, within myself, is, that as I

g

said before, I don't know that it's right to take someone's

9

life. But then I don't know if it's right for someone else

IQ

to take their life.

11

not all for it.

12
13

So I would imagine, you know, that I'm

MR. MORGAN:

You understand this is going to be

your responsibility in this case if you are selected?

14

MS. CHEDESTER:

15

MR. MORGAN:

15

Yes, I could do.

And that you're actually going to

have to make your own individual decision?

17

MS. CHEDESTER: Yes.

18

MR. MORGAN:

19

read to you a few minutes ago?

That is, that law that the Judge

20

MS. CHEDESTER:

Right.

21

THE COURT: That's the law you have to follow.

22

MS. CHEDESTER:

23

THE COURT: And would you be able to come to a

I understand that.

24

decision if the death penalty is appropriate in this case,

25

if the facts warrant it?
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1

MS. CHEDESTER: I don't know if I—I'm sorry, but

2

I don't know if I would want that responsibility t o —
THE COURT:

We need to know now.

4 I

MS. CHEDESTER:

5

THE COURT:

g

You understand it will be your

responsibility?

7

MS. CHEDESTER:

8

THE COURT:

Yes.

I do know that.

Let me put it this way.

You know that

you may not want the responsibility like every other citizen),

9

you have a responsibility to serve on this case when you

10

come in.

11

You understand that, too, as a citizen, that you

are given that responsibility?

12
|3

— t o say t o — y o u k n o w —

I

.-

MS. CHEDESTER:
THE COURT:

Right.

If you were convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, could you
.g I find him guilty?
I7

MS. CHEDESTER:

•8 |

THE COURT:

Yes.

If he was guilty.

And if you were convinced beyond a

.9

reasonable doubt, talking about you personally, because it

20

has to be your own judgment.

21

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating

22

circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances; and
that death was the only appropriate penalty—

23
24
2-

If you were personally

I

MS. CHEDESTER:
THE COURT:

Right,

— c o u l d you impose it, or could you
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1

vote for it?

j

2 I

MS, CHEDESTER:

Yes.

3

MR. MORGAN:

4

THE COURT: Very well.

5

please come back on Friday at 2:00 o'clock.

Okay.

Under those circumstances.

I'm satisfied.

6

MS. CHEDESTER:

1

THE COURT: Thank you.

8

Mr. Blackham, how are you?

9

MR. BLACKHAM:

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you very much and

Thank you, your Honor.

Good.

In this case, the defendant,

11

Mr. Alvarez, is charged with two counts of first-degree

12

murder.

13

those counts or if they found him guilty of a lesser charge,

14

then the jury's function would be completed and I would be

15

responsible for imposing any sentence that might be

16

imposed.

If the jury did not find him guilty of either of

17

If the jury found him guilty of either of the

18

first-degree murder counts, however, then the jury must

19

decide whether a sentence of life imprisonment or death

20

is imposed, and that's the jury's function for that purpose.

21

After the decision of guilt or innocence is made, evidence

22

would be introduced before the jury as to mitigating or

23

aggravating circumstances.

24

And do you understand what I am telling you about?

25

MR. BLACKHAM:

Yeah.
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f those count-,

t:

1

the jury's function would be over and the question of

2

sentencing would be left to the Court.

3

On the other hand, if the jury found Mr. Alvarez

4

guilty of either or both charges of first degree murder,

5

it would be up to the jury to impose the penalty; the

5

penalty to be either the death sentence or life imprisonment

7

Additional evidence as to aggravating and mitigat-

8

ing circumstances—do you understand that, about aggravating

9

and mitigating circumstances?

10

Let me explain it to you.

Aggravating circumstances are those circumstances

11

surrounding the murder which would cause you to be more

12

inclined to impose the death penalty.

13

circumstances would be those circumstances surrounding the

14

murder which would cause you to be less inclined to impose

j£

the death penalty and more inclined to impose life in

jg

prison.

And mitigating

Do you understand?

17

MS. SANCHEZ:

13

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Okay.

Now, after you had had that

19

evidence before you, the Court would instruct you that the

20

death penalty could be imposed by the jury only after the

21

J u r Y unanimously, that is all the members of the jury,

22

found that the State had proved to each juror's satisfaction

2j

and beyond a reasonable doubt, two circumstances:

24

that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating

25

circumstances; and second, that death is the only appropriate
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1

imprisonment instead of the death penalty?

2

MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah.

3

THE COURT:

If you sat on the penalty phase of

4

this trial, would you be willing to listen and give

5

credence and judge the testimony regarding the mitigating

6

circumstances; and if your judgment was that there should

7

be a sentence of life imprisonment instead of the death

8

sentence, would you be willing to vote for it?

9
10
11

MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah.
THE COURT: All right.

Is life in prison, in

your opinion, a severe penalty?

12

MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah.

13

THE COURT:

Do you understand that in the State of

14

Utah, a person who commits first-degree murder and is

15

sentenced to life imprisonment by the jury, may, at some

16

later date, be paroled by the parole board?

17

MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah.

18

THE COURT:

If you had decided that you were

19

going to vote for life imprisonment and not the death

20

penalty; would you, nevertheless, vote for the death

21

penalty just to prevent the defendant from being paroled by

22

the parole board at a later date?

23

MS. SANCHEZ: No.

24

THE COURT:

25

Do you see any conflict between your

sitting on a jury that may impose the death penalty and any
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1 I
2

MS, SANCHEZ:

I mean it is, but I

think it can be dealt with,

3

THE COURT:

4 I

MS. SANCHEZ:

j

THE COURT:

g

of your citizenship?

You think you can handle it?

MS. SANCHEZ:

8

THE COURT:

9

Yes.

Do you regard this as an obligation

7

I feel it is.

Okay.

You recognize the seriousness

of this charge?

10

MS. SANCHEZ:

11

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Your dealing with a man's freedom or

his life?

1
|?

Not really.

,

14 I
15

MS. SANCHEZ:
THE COURT:

Yeah,
And you're also dealing with the

rights of society to be free of people who commit murders?

14

MS. SANCHEZ:

17

THE COURT:

Yeah.

We're dealing with the possibility of

18

punishment by reason of the death of the two victims in

19

this case, and you're aware of that?

20 I

MS. SANCHEZ:

lf

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Do you have any knowledge of this

22 I case that came from any source other t h a n —
MS. SANCHEZ:

3
24

J

THE COURT:

No.

I never heard of it before.

You didn't, before we qualified you,

25 I the day before yesterday?
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9

Yeah.

10

I

evidence,
i
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13
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14
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15
SANCKL2 .

16
17

MR. MORGAN:

lv >.
Thank y o u .

i

19
20
21
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^
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